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A SURVEY OF ANTITRUST LAW IN THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION

When investors and commercial entities look to expand
their operations into new markets, they will almost certainly
consider going into the European Economic Community
(EEC). Its members-West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium,
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, United Kingdom, and
Ireland'-are among the world's most affluent and industrialized nations. Their economies are active, their labor forces
relatively well-educated, and they provide a steady demand
for a wide range of products and services. 2 But any investor or
commercial entity planning to take advantage of these conditions must also consider what effects the EEC's antitrust laws
will have on its business. Any venture which is planned and
executed without regard for these laws runs a serious risk of
being subjected to stiff fines and serious restraints on its
commercial activity.
This comment will attempt to trace the development of
the EEC's antitrust laws to date, with primary emphasis on
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty3 and its prohibition of agreements
restraining competition. These agreements include pricefixing, market allocation, and tying.' EEC control of monopolies, which consists not of outlawing them as does American
law, ' but of prohibiting their "abuse" through Article 86,6 will
also receive some attention.
As will be seen, the fact that the EEC is primarily an
economic entity, one of whose foremost goals is the promotion
of economic well-being, has meant that many practices which
might be viewed as anti-competitive under American antitrust
1. The first six nations were the original members; the latter three were admitted
in 1973.
2. The per capita gross national products of the nine Member States are among
the top thirty in the world. See F. FELIX, WORLD MARKETS OF TOMORROW 19 (1972).
3. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 85, March 24,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 47-48 (1958) [hereinafter cited as the Treaty of Rome]. The texts
of Treaty Articles 85 and 86 are reproduced in appendices A and B infro.
4. Id.
5. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
6. Treaty of Rome art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 48-49 (1958). The text of Article 86 is
reproduced at app. B infra.

536

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

law are permitted when they promote efficiency or market integration.
The fact that the EEC encompasses many different languages and legal systems accentuates the emphasis on efficiency and market integration. Strict verbal and doctrinal interpretations of Community competition law take second place
to interpretations advancing these two goals.'
The difficulty of making strict interpretations in this context has led to great flexibility of Community competition law.
This flexibility is, in fact, expressly provided for in Article
85.3's exemption procedure,' and by the use of an "appreciable" restraint concept.' A restraint on trade, in order to be
prohibited, must work a significant effect on trade between
Member States. Thus agreements between small and mediumsized firms generally escape the strictures of Article 85, since
their actions are deemed to have little effect on interstate
trade.'"
There may be no need to show, however, an actual restraint of interstate trade where an agreement is intended to
restrain competition, and the firms involved are capable of
doing so, due to their market power." For example, vertical
restraints imposed by a manufacturer upon a distributor which
are capable of restricting competition between distributors can
be violative of Article 85, even where horizontal competition
between manufadturers may be increased.' 2 Furthermore, Articles 85 and 86 are violated by anticompetitive activities taking
place outside the Community if they have effects within the
Community."
Article 85 speaks of agreements between enterprises, and
this has been interpreted to mean that two or more firms must
agree or cooperate in order to come within its scope.' 4 Related
7. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
8. Treaty of Rome art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 47-48. The texts of Treaty Articles
85
and 86 are reproduced at apps. A and B infra.
9. See text accompanying note 208 infra.
10. Id.
11. But see C. OBERDORFER, A. GLEIss, & H. HIRSCH, COMMON MARKET CARTEL
LAW 33 n. 65a (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as OBERDORFER].
12. Establissements Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. EEC Comm'n,
11961-66 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8046 at 7652 (Ct. J. 1966)
[hereinafter cited as Grundig].
13. See, e.g., Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. EEC Comm'n, [1971-73
Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8161, at 8008-09 (Ct. J. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as Imperial Chemical] discussed in text accompanying note 129 infra.
14. Grundig, supra note 12, 8046, at 7651.
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firms within one enterprise are capable of restraining competition in some instances, but generally speaking, Community
authorities see little possibility for real competition between
related firms. In most cases, then, these firms do not violate
Article 85 when they impose restrictive terms such as territorial
restraints on each other.'5
Due to the infrequent use of the intra-enterprise conspiracy concept for agreements between related firms,'" and to the
infrequent application of Article 86,'7 which prohibits abuses of
dominant position, corporate growth by internal expansion,
mergers, and acquisitions is encouraged.'"
Firms need not contract to restrain competition, and Article 85 takes this into account by prohibiting agreements, decisions, and concerted practices which restrain competition.
Thus any form of cooperation, whether it be by binding contract or by consensual arrangement, violates Article 85 where
it has the requisite restrictive effect on competition within the
Common Market. 9
Great use is made of administrative procedures in the application of EEC competition law, and it is through these procedures that many forms of cooperation are allowed,2 including
joint marketing agreements, and joint research and development agreements. 2'
The industrial property area should see much change in
the near future, as a result of the recent ratification of a Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market.22
This treaty will permit the creation of a Community patent
office, and a uniform body of patent law will replace most of
the idiosyncracies of national patent laws. The laws of the
Member States have, until now, played a primary role in determining the legality of many restrictive practices accompanying
the use of industrial property rights. They have been overlooked in favor of Community law only when their application
15. See discussion of intra-enterprise conspiracy in text accompanying notes 16285 infra.
16. Id.
17. Treaty of Rome art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 48-49 (1958). The text of Article 86 is
reproduced in app. B infra.
18. See note 181 and accompanying text infra.
19. See OBERDORFER, supra note 11, at 14-15.
20. See discussion of negative clearances in text accompanying note 211 infra,
and discussion of exemptions in text accompanying note 215 infra.
21. See, e.g., note 233 and accompanying text infra.
22. See note 259 infra.
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has frustrated market integration by raising national trade barriers, which is a violation of Community integration and competition policy.23
The holder of an industrial property right does not abuse
a dominant position and thereby violate Article 86 merely by
blocking unauthorized use of the right, although Community
authorities have not ruled out this possibility. A patentee may,
for example, abuse his dominant position where he possesses a
powerful market position in the patented product, and then
proceeds to gouge his customers, who have little choice but to
continue to deal with him.
Article 86 has not yet been successfully applied to undo
mergers and acquisitions. Community authorities require a
showing that a merged firm will dominate in the marketplace-that it need take little account of its competitors and
customers. Only at this point will there be the required abuse
of dominant position.2" Article 86 has, in fact, seen little use by
Community authorities. Only where dominant firms have used
predatory practices have violations of Article 86 been found.
Thus EEC competition law does not adhere to rigid notions as to the efficacy of pure competition as both a means to
and an end embodying economic and political good, as does its
American counterpart. Community law is extremely flexible in
allowing practices which promote efficiency while not hindering the goal of market integration. Once the Common Market
has become a final reality, Community authorities will be free
to address more fully the maintenance of competition.
American and EEC Rules Compared
American antitrust law has had a strong influence on its
EEC counterpart, but the American propensity for preserving
competition at almost any cost has no place in the EEC.27
23. See text accompanying note 26 infra.
24. See text accompanying note 157 infra.
25. See, e.g., text accompanying note 274 infra.
26. See, e.g., Commercial Solvents Corp. v. EEC Comm'n, [1974 Transfer
Binderl CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8209 at 8209 (Ct. J. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Commercial Solvents].
27. Compare Treaty of Rome art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 47-48 (1958), which allows
exceptions to the prohibitions of Article 85.1 where the economic benefits to be
gained
outweigh anticompetitive effects, with the American concept of per se illegality
for
some types of agreements. See, e.g., Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United
States, 175

U.S. 211, 237 (1899).

1976]

EEC ANTITRUST LAW

Antitrust law in the United States has shown itself hostile to
many aggregations of private economic power, the rationale
being that expressed by Madison in The Federalist:when any
one person or group of persons holds great individual power, the
likelihood of tyranny is increased, since the capability to impose one's wishes arbitrarily on others grows in proportion to
the amount of unchecked power he holds."8 Thus one of the
major goals in American antitrust enforcement has been to
preserve diversity through competition so as to avoid economic
tyranny."
In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,30 Judge
Learned Hand noted:
.. .Throughout the history of these statutes it has been
constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possi-

ble cost, an organization of industry in small units which
can effectively compete with each other."t
Judge Hand continued, quoting Senator Sherman from the
debates over the Sherman Act: "If the concerted powers of this
combination are intrusted to a single man, it is a kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form of government ... "'
Monopolization is illegal per se under American antitrust

law,3" as are horizontal divisions of markets, in which one
company agrees with another not to compete in the other's

3
territory;3 4 price fixing," group boycotts; " and tying, where a
seller who owns a patent, for example, requires his buyer to

purchase an unpatented item along with it."
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56-57 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). The
antidote to this tyranny, Madison proposed, was the preservation of diversity so that
there would be little possibility of clear-cut majority interests with the ability to
suppress minorities. Id. at 62-65, 351.
29. See Devine, Foreign Establishment and the Antitrust Law; A Study of the
Antitrust Consequences of the Principle Forms of Investment by American Corporations in Foreign Markets, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 400, 402-03 (1962).
30. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) [hereinafter cited as Alcoa].
31. Id. at 429.
32. Id. at 428 n.1.
33. See id. at 427-28; United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948)(dictum).
34. See United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972).
35. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940).
36. See Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457
(1941).
37. Thus, in International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 394-96 (1947),
the Court held the defendant's practice of requiring purchasers of its patented machines to buy its salt as well to be per se illegal.
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In contrast, there are no per se illegalities in EEC
competition law." Monopolies are subject to sanction only
when they abuse their dominant positions;" in addition, tying
and market allocation are frowned upon but occasionally approved.4" One commentator has considered these differences:
. . .There has been almost no development of per se illegalities. . . the notion that certain things are unlawful no
matter how one does them. Rather, Community law
teaches one to weigh the impact of the restraints in their
economic context. If the impact is significant, a problem
may exist; otherwise, probably not. . . .41
The lack of per se prohibitions, however, is not necessarily
indicative of a lax concern for competition problems. Rather,
it reflects the dissimilar political contexts in which each set of
laws operates. The Community is still trying to create a larger
market and break down territorial barriers. It is using its antitrust laws to assist in the attainment of these goals.
In the United States, on the other hand, the replacement
of the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution meant
that state boundaries were no longer to be used to hinder the
free flow of goods between the states.4" Thus American antitrust law is primarily directed toward controlling the abuses
of raw capitalism.
EEC's

ANTITRUST RULES DESIGNED TO FURTHER ITS

ORGANIZATIONAL AIMS

One of the primary aims of the EEC is to dissolve national
trade barriers 4" so as to create a Common Market." But a uni38. See Treaty of Rome art. 85.3, 298 U.N.T.S. 47-48 (1958). The text of Article
85.3 is reproduced in app. A infra. See also Jones, Production,Dominant Positionsand
Mergers, in CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY, EEC RULES OF COMPETITION, REPORT
OF THE CONFERENCE IN LONDON ON 5 DECEMBER 1972 at 22 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as
Jonesi.
39. Treaty of Rome art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 48-49 (1958). The text of Article 86 is
reproduced in app. B infra.
40. Id. art. 85.3, 298 U.N.T.S. 48 (1958). The text of Article 85.3 is reproduced
in app. A infra.
41. Jones, supra note 38, at 22.
42. Compare U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, with ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION (1781). The
latter provided no authority for federal regulation of interstate commerce. DOWLINC &
GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 215-16 (8th
ed. 1970).
43. See generally Marchini-Camia, Objectives, Content, Procedure, in
CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY, EEC RULES OF COMPETITION,
REPORT OF THE
CONFERENCE IN LONDON ON 5 DECEMBER 1972, at 10 (1973) [hereinafter

CBI

cited as

Marchini-Camial.
44. Treaty of Rome art. 2, 298 U.N.T.S. 15 (1958).
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fled market is not an end in itself; it is a means of promoting
economic development and efficiency through the more rational use of resources, and an accompanying decrease in the
use of arbitrary geopolitical boundaries to restrain competition
from outside those borders.45 Territorial trade barriers such as
tariffs and national industrial property rights used to block
competitive imports restrict the size of the markets to be profitably exploited, since the crossing of customs barriers adds to
selling prices. Because markets are limited by such restrictions,
business entities are less able to expand." The promotion of
this larger Common Market among the Member States allows
the commercial entities to serve a larger demand, and so take
advantage of the economies of scale of the larger market.
Antitrust law in the EEC is a strong means to effectuate
the combined goals of a unitary market and increased efficiency. With these goals achieved, the ultimate goal of a higher
standard of living for the peoples of the Common Market
States is attainable.
Problems in Integratingthe Markets of the Member States into
One
The integration of the national markets into a Common
Market is not without its problems. There has been political
conflict between the Community government and its constituents, and among the Member States themselves." Some of the
problems relate to language, and others to the difficulty of
melding together diverse legal systems.
These problems have resulted in slow-paced enforcement
and in a mixture of sometimes conflicting objectives. There is
an official community desire to promote competition- an
objective not always shared by the Member Governments and
powerful business interests." Furthermore, achieving market
integration, a second major objective of the EEC, may require
either encouraging competition or, in some cases, approving
45. BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL S.A., THE EEC ON THE MOVE: ISSUES FOR BUSINESS
IN AN EXPANDING COMMUNITY 137 (Special Report 72-1, 1972).

46.

See Balassa, Trade Liberalization Among Industrial Countries, in

REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 195-201 (Fulda & Schwartz ed.

1970).
47.
48.
49.

Id.
See, e.g., OBERDORFER, supra note 11, at 66.
Thus, Italy, for example, has no antitrust laws. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.

2003.034 (1973).

'11
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anti-competitive transactions such as cross-boundary mergers
which promote closer ties between firms of different Member
States." Also in conflict with the desire to promote competition
is the EEC's concern with the size and success of American
investment, which has led to an approving attitude toward
European mergers and cooperation in specific industries."
As a result of the number of governments concerned with
competition problems in the EEC, there may be a number of
different authorities responsible for dealing with the same
problem, and consequently it is sometimes difficult to know in
advance which one will decide a given issue." Additionally, the
EEC brings together legal systems, languages, and judges and
lawyers from many countries. Judicial decisions must be the
result of comparative studies, so as to enable the attorneys of
the Member States to comprehend them. Thus verbal hairsplitting in the EEC generally takes a back seat to arguments
based on integration policy.5"
50. The encouragement of cross-boundary mergers even when there are anticompetitive features to them is illustrated by recent Commission approval of a joint venture between Chevron (U.S.) and SHV (Netherlands). In its go-ahead to the firms,
the
Commission acknowledged that Chevron would be price fixing. Prior to the agreement,
Chevron had been the sole distributor of tar products for northern Europe. What saved
the agreement, in part, was the Commission's emphasis that it drew an EEC firm into
the distribution of these products for the first time. Bus. EUROPE, Jan. 17, 1975, at
1718.
51. Rahl, Relationship of U.S. to EEC Antitrust Law, in ABA SECTION ON INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW, CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING
BUSINESS IN EUROPE

79 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Rahl].
This concern with American success in Europe has promoted Director-General
Schleider, of the EEC Commission's Directorate General for Competition, to say that
there is virtually no antitrust enforcement in the aerospace and computer fields since
"Jaj European computer combine . . . may be the only way to offer Europeans
a
choice, since IBM might otherwise preempt the market." This concern has not,
however, created a hostile, discriminatory attitude toward American firms, according
to
the general consensus and to the Board Chairman of Monsanto Europe SA. Wall Street
Journal, April 25, 1973, col. 3 at 31.
52. Deringer, A PractionerLooks at the German and EEC Rules As Applied to
Mergers, Acquisitions, and Joint Ventures, in ABA INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE
LAW
SECTION, CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN EUROPE
65 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Deringer].
53. Id. This balancing of linguistics against substantive policy appears as well
in reference to Article 85's prohibition of "concerted practices":
The German term for this concept . . . may literally be translated as
"mutually attuned modes of conduct" and does not
necessarily connote
agreed-upon action. Both the German and the French "pratiques concert6es" would appear to exclude the application of Article 85.1 to mere
conciousness of consensual element. . . . [Actually, though], the term
"concerted practices" is intended to reach even
informal states of fact

19"761
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The major institutions of the EEC responsible for the application of Community antitrust rules are the European Court
of Justice, the Council of Ministers of the European Communi4
ties, and the Commission of the European Communities. The
Council of Ministers is the EEC's legislative body, composed
of ministers from each Member State.5" The Commission is the
Community's executive body, charged with enforcement of
Community law.5" It fulfills this function through judicial ac8
tions"7 and by the promulgation of regulations and decisions."
Most measures to be considered by the Council must be initiated by the Commission. 9
The Court of Justice functions to protect individuals
against acts of the Community, and generally to assure the
60
correct, uniform interpretation of the Treaty of Rome, which
is the EEC's primary source of legal authority. It does not
interpret the laws of the Member States. Only the courts of the
Member States may do this.6 However, national courts of last
resort faced with problems of interpretation of Community law
must request preliminary rulings from the Court on those isand situations where the participants remain without commitment. An
intent on the part of the participants to bind themselves legally is not
required. . . . Necessary, however, is some conduct pursuant to a concious mutual meeting of the minds. Two (or more) enterprises must mutually adjust their future market behavior one to the other conciously and
intentionally.
OBERDORFER, supra note 11 at 14.
Thus, in the Imperial Chemical case, supra note 13, at 8027, the European Court
of Justice held that the term "concerted practices" encompasses: "[A] form of coordination between undertakings which, without going so far as to amount to an agreement
• . . knowingly substitutes a practical cooperation between them for the risks of
competition."
54. Article 4 of the Treaty of Rome, art. 4, 298 U.N.T.S. 16, provides for the
creation of an Assembly, a Council, a Commission, and a Court of Justice for the EEC.
55. Id. arts. 145-54, 298 U.N.T.S. 69-71.
56. Id. art. 155, 298 U.N.T.S. 71.
57. Id. arts. 169, 173, 175, 298 U.N.T.S. 75; i.e., through suits for violations of
Community law.
58. Id. art. 189, 298 U.N.T.S. 78. Article 189 requires Member States, their
institutions, officials, and all natural and legal persons within the Community to
adhere to regulations promulgated by the Council and Commission. Regulations have
the weight of national law and take effect upon issuance. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
4902.15 (1971).
Whereas regulations are applicable to groups of persons defined generally [id.1,
decisions bind only those parties who are directly addressed, and they do not carry the
weight of law when directed to Member States, as do regulations. They are however,
902.25-.26.
immediately binding on individuals. Id. at
59. Id. at 4472.09.
60. Treaty of Rome art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. 76 (1958).
61. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 4602.11 (1976).
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sues.2 They may then proceed to apply Community law. The
Court of Justice also reviews actions of the Council and Commission on request of the Member States, the Commission,
Council, and individuals affected by Community actions. 3
The Commission decides initially whether there has been
a violation of Articles 85 or 86 of the Rome Treaty, which contains the basic antitrust provisions in EEC law. 4 If it finds such
a violation, the Court may issue an injunction 5 or impose a
fine. 6 Article 85.2 declares that terms of agreements which
contravene Article 85.1 are void.67 Thus the Commission may
invalidate those parts of an agreement which are found to violate Article 85.1, or the whole of the agreement if the restrictive
terms are inseparably bound into the whole.66
Private plaintiffs are allowed to sue on their own initiative
to invoke Article 85.2 and thus escape the terms of illegal agreements to which they are parties; 6 but a private party may sue
for injury due to anti-competitive practices only where the law
of the Member State in which he sues confers that right.'"
IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLES

85

AND

86

EEC cartel law was initially framed by Treaty Articles 85
and 86. It has been supplemented and effected by various regulations issued by the Council."' Regulation 17, the main impleSee Treaty of Rome art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. at 76. See also 2 CCH COMM. MKT.
4656.06 (1976).
63. Treaty of Rome art. 173, 298 U.N.T.S. 75 (1958).
64. Council Regulation 17, art. 3, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2421 (1971).
65. Id.
66. Council Regulation 17, arts. 15, 16, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
2541, 2551
(1973).
67. The text of Article 85 is reproduced in app. A infra. Cf. Grundig, supra note
12, at 7653.
68. Id.
69. See Council Regulation 17, art. 1, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2402 (1973);
W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 470 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as FUGATE].
70. Suits for damages are governed by national law. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
2041.70, 2041.90, 2041.95 (1973).
71. Council Regulation 26, art. 2, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
935B (1975) exempts agricultural trade and production agreements "which form an integral part of
a national market organization..." from the prohibitions of Article 85.1 of the Treaty
of Rome. Council regulation 1017/68, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
2761 (1971), and
Article 84 of the Treaty of Rome, do the same for sea and air transport. Antitrust
regulation of public utilities is also modified by Article 90 of the Treaty: see 1 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP.
2014.05, 2361 (1973). Coal and steel production is regulated under
the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), April 18,
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 142; see 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2003.05 (1973).
62.

REP.
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menting regulation for Articles 85 and 86,2 declares both Arti-

cles positive law, and prohibits all violations without requiring
prior decision by the Commission or Court of Justice. 3 Article
9 of Regulation 17 distributes jurisdiction between national
and Community authorities. 4
Until the Commission initiates proceedings pertaining to
(1) a negative clearance, 5 (2) an exemption under Article
85.3,6 or (3) a prohibition of practices under Article 85.1, national courts may apply Community law to proceedings
brought initially under national cartel law." National authorities do not, however, have the power to grant negative clearances, nor exemptions under Article 85.3. These powers are
reserved to the Commission, subject to review by the Court of
Justice. 8 National courts are not deprived of jurisdiction to
consider pending cases involving national antitrust laws when
the Commission subsequently initiates actions, 9 but national
antitrust authorities are forbidden to initiate suits in national
courts once the Commission has initiated its own proceedings.'"
In a 1969 case, Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt,"'the
Court of Justice made clear that it considers Community cartel
law a distinct legal order which is incorporated into the laws
of the Member States, to be obeyed by their authorities, and
2401-2634
72. Council Regulation 17, arts. 1-25, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
(1973); see OBERDORFER, supra note 11, at 131-33.
73. OBERDORFER, supra note 11, at 131. See also Treaty of Rome art. 189, 298
U.N.T.S. 78 (1958).
74. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2481 (1971).
75. The negative clearance procedure outlined in Regulation 17(2), id. at 241,
provides that private parties may inform the Commission of their agreements for
official assurances that Articles 85 and 86 have not been contravened. Once a negative
clearance has been granted to an applying party, the Commission can revoke that
clearance and sue for violation of Articles 85.1 or 86 only when new factors arise in
relation to the practices in question which were not known at the time of the grant.
OBERDORFER, supra note 11, at 141. Compare the negative clearance procedure with
that for exemptions, note 76 infra.
76. The exemption procedure is an admission by the applying party that a particular practice violates Article 85.1. The Commission is authorized by Article 85.3 to
exempt the practice from the rule of Article 85.1. Treaty of Rome art. 85.3, 298
2431
U.N.T.S. 48 (1958), and by Regulation 17, art. 4, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
(1971), where the practice's advantages in the form of increased efficiency, services,
and lowered prices outweigh its restraint upon competition.
77. Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, [1967-70 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM.
8056, at 7866 (Ct. J. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Tar Colors].
MKT. REP.
78. Council Regulation 17, art. 9, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2481 (1971).
79. Tar Colors, supra note 77, at 7866.
80. Council Regulation 17 art. 9, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2481 (1971).
81. Tar Colors, supra note 77.
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supreme vis a vis national law when the requirements of Article
85 and 86 have been met. It ruled that national courts were not
to frustrate the uniform application of Community law, either
past or prospective. 2 This decision allows national authorities
to resolve their domestic antitrust problems without being
forced to wait for the Commission to complete its actions. 3
Nevertheless, there are many unresolved questions under
EEC competition law, and to promote uniform interpretation
of Community law, the Courts of the Member States are
obliged to refer these issues to the Court of Justice for resolution."
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE

85

Most antitrust actions in the EEC are brought under Article 85,15 which prohibits practices "liable to affect trade be82. Id. Thus if the Commission determined, for example, that a particular agreement violated Article 85, a national court could not subsequently contradict that
determination. But see OBERDORFER, supra note 11, at 66.
83. If the Commission or Court of Justice later comes to a conclusion contrary
to the national authorities, the latter must conform their actions to those taken by
Community authorities. For a comment on the effects of slow Commission action due
to a deluge of notifications for agreements, see Jacobs, Some Developments and Differences in the Operation of Competition Laws, 8 INT'L LAW. 544, 558-59 (1974).
84. Treaty of Rome art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. 76-77 (1958).
85. There have been, to date, only eight cases in which violations of Article 86
have been asserted: Commission Decision of Dec. 17, 1975, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9800 (United Brands Co.); General Motors Continental S.A. v. EEC Comm'n, 2 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP.
9705 (Ct. J. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GMC]; Cooperative
Vereeniging "Suiker Unie" v. EEC Comm'n, 363 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. EUROMARKET
NEWS, Rep. No. 282, at 2 (Ct. J. Dec. 16, 1975), modifying Commission Decision of
Jan. 2, 1973, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9570 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Sugar
Cartel]; Belgische Radio en Televisie v. SABAM [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM.
MKT. REP.
8269 (Ct. J. 1974); Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. v. EEC
Comm'n [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8209 (Ct. J. 1974); Europemballage Corp. v. EEC Comm'n, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8171 (Ct. J. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Continental Can]; Deutsche Grammophon
GmbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co. KG, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] CCH
COMM. MKT. REP.
8106 (Ct. J. 1971); Commission Decision of June 2, 1971 [1970-72
Transfer Binder, New Developments] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9438 (GEMA).
There have been many more asserted violations of Article 85.1.
The most recent application of Article 86 is the Commission's decision in 1975
imposing a fine of one million units of account on United Brands Corp. (UBC). UBC,
a conglomerate with $2 billion in revenues worldwide, resulted from the 1957 merger
of United Fruit Co. and John Morrell Co., the largest meat packer in the United States.
Commission Decision of Dec. 17, 1975, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9800. UBC is the
world's leading exporter of bananas, with 35% of world markets and a 40% share of
EEC banana trade, and sells under the Chiquita label. Id. at 9776.
The Commission found that UBC had abused its dominant position by:
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tween Member States and which are designed to prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the Common Market or
which have this effect.""
Practices Must Be Liable to Affect Trade Between Member
States
The prohibition of agreements which "affect trade between Member States" could be called the EEC's Interstate
Commerce Clause. It applies where the parties to the agreement trade between two Member States, for example. But even
a cartel operating in a single Member State can be subjected
to the proscriptions of Article 85."
a) Prohibiting its distributors from reselling green bananas, which are the only
ones suitable for shipping. UBC was thus able to prevent the distributors from competing with it in sales to distributors in other areas, and also partitioned markets by this
means. Id. at 9787.
b) Engaging in price discrimination toward customers in different Member
States, with no objective justification therefore. UBC argued that it merely sold at
prices which each market would bear. The Commission responded that the systematic
application of high prices by a dominant firm could not be justified without objective
differences in selling costs-i.e., tariffs and shipping costs-where it results in the
partitioning of markets by placing distributors paying high prices at a competitive
disadvantage with other distributors on resale in other areas. Id.
c) Charging unfair prices to some distributors. UBC occupied a dominant position, with 40% of EEC banana sales. Its main competitors, Del Monte Co., and Castle
& Cooke Co., had a combined market share of only 19% of that market. Thus UBC
was able to determine prices without taking substantial account of its customers,
suppliers, and competitors. This was especially so since UBC had been the first to
introduce aggressive marketing techniques for its branded bananas, along with new
methods of ripening which required expensive, modernized facilities for shipping and
storage. Because of its size, vertical integration, and multinational character, UBC was
best able to afford these large investments. Id. at 9788-89.
d) Suddenly and without warning withdrawing supply to one of its major distributors which had begun to distribute bananas offered by a competitor. The refusal to
deal left the distributor without adequate stocks to fulfill its agreements with its
customers, and left it with unused capacity which had been expanded and modernized
so as to handle UBC's bananas. The Commission viewed this practice as a warning to
its distributors to sell only UBC products; it thus prevented UBC's competitors from
entering markets so as to compete with UBC. Id. at 9789-90.
In determining the size of the fine, the Commission considered important the fact
that the product in question was a widely consumed food item, and that UBC's receipts
for EEC banana sales were over $50 million annually. It ordered UBC to allow its
distributors to ship green bananas, prohibited further price discrimination, and "suggested" that UBC lower its prices 15% in certain markets. Id. at 9792.
86. Treaty of Rome art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 47-48 (1958). The text of Article 85 is
reproduced in app. A infra.
87. This was the situation in Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v. EEC
8179 (Ct. J. 1972). In
Comm'n, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
that case a cartel of Dutch cement producers and distributors sought to impose uniform quality standards and "recommended prices" on cement in the Netherlands.
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The Court of Justice in Establissements Consten and
Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. EEC Commission" interpreted
this provision of Article 85. Grundig had assigned its trademark
to Consten for trade in France. Anyone who sold Grundig products there without Consten's consent infringed the trademark
under French law. In addition, Grundig agreed to prevent its
wholesalers in other territories from selling outside those territories. In return, Consten agreed not to sell outside France.
When an unauthorized French wholesaler began distributing in
France Grundig products which it had purchased in Germany
from an authorized German wholesaler, Consten sued for
trademark infringement.
The Court found that the exclusive distributorship agreement and the use of the trademark to block imports restrained
trade between Member States, since Consten and the other
distributors had agreed to refrain from exporting to other
Member States. "
Grundig and Consten argued that the agreement had stimulated interbrand competition because Grundig's exports to
France had increased. Thus, they argued, trade between Member States and competition between manufacturers had increased. Because the Commission had failed to consider the
positive effects on interbrand competition, they contended, it
had misjudged the agreement's overall effect on competition.'"
The Court answered:
The principle of freedom of competition applies to all economic levels and all aspects of competition. Competition
between producers is generally more apparent than competition between distributors of the same brand. This does
not, however, mean that an agreement that restricts competition between distributors should escape the prohibiThough it disclaimed any intent to inhibit imports, the agreements were subjected to
the coverage of Article 85.1 by the Court of Justice:
Under Article 85, paragraph 1, any cartel whose object or effect is to
prevent, restrict, or distort competition is incompatible with the Treaty
to the extent that it is capable of impairing trade between Member
States. A cartel extending throughout the territory of a Member State has
by its very nature, the effect of consolidating the partitioning of markets
on the national level, thus preventing the economic interpenetration
which the Treaty attempts to bring about.
Id. at 8412-13.
88. Grundig, supra note 12.
89. Id. at 7653.
90. Id. at 7652.
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tion of Article 85.1, because it might strengthen competition between producers.
Furthermore, for purposes of applying Article 85.1, it is not
necessary to take into consideration the actual effects of an
agreement where its purpose is to prevent . . . competition. Consequently, the fact that the Commission's decision did not analyze the effects of the agreement on competition between similar products of different brands is not
in itself a defect in the decision.'

Commentators have argued that this statement was a misconceived obiter dictum since the Court had already found the
requisite anticompetitive effect. 2 Further, they argued that
"the intended but unrealized restraint is of no significance for
the law" since Article 85 is directed against anti-competitive
effects, not attitudes."3
Another objection to the Grundig opinion was that the
Court did away with the objective test of "actual damage" to
competition and replaced it with a subjective "intent" test. 4
The issue of the degree of intent necessary to constitute a violation of Article 85 created a semantic quagmire." Critics of the
Grundig opinion argued further that a showing of some actual
restraint of competition should have been required."
But these objections are open to question. The Court of
Justice had two alternatives in the case: (1) to declare the
territorial restraints null and void for their restrictive effect on
competition between distributors, and thus stimulate competition on that level;97 or (2) to exempt the agreement under Arti91. Id. at 7652-53. This reasoning follows that of Justice Fortas for the Supreme
Court in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1967):
Schwinn contends . . . that the reasons which induced it to adopt the
challenged distribution program were to enable it and the small, independent merchants that made up its chain of distribution to compete more
effectively in the marketplace. Schwinn sought a better way of distributing its product: a method which would promote sales, increase the stability of its distributor and dealer outlets, and augment profits. But this
argument, appealing as it is, is not enough to avoid the Sherman Act
proscription; because, in a sense, every restrictive practice is designed to
augment the profit and competitive position of its participants. Price
fixing does so, for example, so may a well-calculated division of territories.
92. OBERDORFER, supra note 11, at 33 n.65a.
93. Id. at 32.
94. Id. at 33.
95. Id. at 32.
96. Id. at 34.
97. Treaty of Rome art. 85.2, 298 U.N.T.S. 48 (1958). The text of Article 85 is
reproduced in app. A infra.
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cle 85.3 by balancing the positive and negative effects, thereby
stimulating competition between producers." It opted for the
former since the burden of proof under Article 85.3 was on
Grundig to show that the agreement's benefits outweighed its
proven restrictive effect on competition between distributors.99
Because of its wide distribution and the nature of the particular product markets, Grundig was capable of restraining
competition between distributors.°0 It obviously intended to do
so. That it may not have been entirely successful in thwarting
Consten's competition made no difference, since the mere attempt to do so was apt to have discouraged parallel imports.'0 '
Thus the "intended but unrealized" restraint may indeed be
significant.102
Similarly, the Court of Justice reaffirmed the use of a
probability standard in Socift6 Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH:
The expression "liable to affect

. . ."

proves that the

change in trading conditions must be established directly
by the facts or result from reasonableexpectation and that
the influence on trade must be fairly significant." 3
Through such cases as Grundig, Article 85 has been interpreted generally to proscribe the use by EEC or non-EEC firms
of intra-Community export prohibitions requiring Community
firms to keep their activities within one Member State. 04 These
98. See Grundig, supra note 12, at 7653.
99. See id. at 7655-56.
100. See id. at 7653.
101. Id. at 7653. In its Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, the Commission explained its "appreciable restraint" test-when parties to a restrictive agreement
have a weak position in the market and cannot perceptibly restrain competition,
Article 85 is inapplicable. Where the parties to the agreement account for less than
five per cent of the relevant product market, and their combined sales for that product
are less than twenty-million units of account (roughly equivalent to U.S. dollars, but
see note 209 infra), they are presumed incapable of perceptibly altering trade within
the Community. Commission Notice of June 2, 1970, [1970-72 Transfer Binder, New
Developments] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9367, at 8794-95.
102. Grundig, supra note 12, at 7652 (dictum). See text accompanying note 92
supra; but see Soci6t6 Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, [1961-66
Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8047, at 7696 (Ct. J. 1966).
103. [1961-66 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8047, at 7689 (Ct. J.
1966). For a view of the American "Rule of Reason" and the per se test, see note 219
infra.
104. See, e.g., Commission decision of June 30, 1970, [1970-72 Transfer Binder,
New Developments] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9378, at 8819 (negative clearance for
Eastman Kodak Co.).
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agreements are objectionable, in the view of the Commission
and Court, because they partition domestic markets and thus
hinder the creation of a unitary market.
An example of an agreement partitioning markets is the
Kodak case, in which Eastman Kodak applied to the Commission for a negative clearance' 5 of absolute export prohibitions
on its EEC subsidiaries. Kodak's distribution system was approved by the Commission only after Kodak agreed to allow the
subsidiaries to trade throughout the Community." 6
Kodak had imposed export restraints on its subsidiaries by
forcing purchasers of Kodak products to buy through the subsidiaries of their respective Member States. 107 If the purchaser
went outside his Member State to purchase Kodak products,
the sale was invoiced through the subsidiary of his Member
State at its price, thus preventing customers from shopping for
better terms.' ° There are, in the Court's view, very few agreements capable of restraining trade between a parent and its
wholly-owned subsidiary.' 0 Thus the agreements found to restrain competition were those between the Kodak subsidiaries
and their customers, not those betwen the subsidiaries and
Kodak."10
The Commission allowed Kodak to continue to restrain its
EEC subsidiaries from doing business outside the Community."' It reasoned that once goods have been shipped out
of the Community, there is little likelihood that they will reenter, since the added transportation costs and duties will make
resale in the EEC prohibitive."' Thus, trade between Member
States would be unaffected by the restraint on exports out of
the EEC." 3
ExtraterritorialJurisdiction
Where one or more of the parties to a restrictive practice
is domiciled outside the Community, the prohibitions of Arti105. Id. For a brief explanation of the negative clearance procedure, see note 75
supra.
106. Commission Decision of June 30, 1970, [1970-72 Transfer Binder, New Developments] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9378, at 8818-19.
107. Id. at 8818.
108. Id. at 8819.
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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cle 85.1 apply when the practices in question have the effect of
hindering free trade within."' This application of EEC law to
non-domiciliaries has even been asserted in some cases on the
basis of conduct occurring outside the Market which produces
effects within." 5
American Assertion of ExtraterritorialJurisdiction. The
assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction for antitrust violations
has been in controversy since United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America."6 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
Alcoa Ltd., Alcoa's Canadian subsidiary, subject to American
antitrust jurisdiction for its participation in an anticompetitive
international agreement. This agreement left the American
aluminum market primarily in the hands of the parent corporation, Alcoa." 7 In his opinion, Judge Hand noted the limits of
American judicial power in an international context:
We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all
whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the United States. . . . On the other hand,
it is settled law-as Limited itself agrees-that any state
may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders which the state
reprehends. . . .*I
The Court required the government to show that Alcoa
Ltd. intended a restraint on competition in the United States.
Once this intent had been shown, the court held, the burden
was on the Canadian firm to show no effect on competition.
The presumption made here was that the withdrawal of
competitive supply resulted in higher prices than would have
existed had prices been determined by free market conditions."'
American courts have maintained the reach of their jurisdiction over international agreements. In United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd.,""° a United States District
Court ordered the revision of a patent-licensing agreement be114. See Dyestuffs cases, [1971-73 Transfer Binder CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8161 et. seq. (Ct. J. 1972); Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import-Export SA, 31971-73
Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8149, at 7697 (Ct. J. 1971).
115. See, e.g., Imperial Chemical, supra note 13, at 2030-31.
116. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)[hereinafter cited as Alcoal.
117. See id. at 443-45.
118. Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 445.
120. 105 F. Supp. 215 (D.C.N.Y. 1952).
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tween a British firm and an American firm on the ground that
the agreement's allocation of American and British markets
restrained competition in the American market.'
United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information
Center, Inc. 2 ' involved agreements between Swiss trade associations and various Swiss and American watch manufacturers
and distributors. An American federal district court went be23
yond declaring the agreements violative of the Sherman Act,"
and affirmatively ordered the defendant organization to void
certain Swiss contracts.'24 In addition, the watchmakers were
ordered to end all restraints on exports to the United States,
even though the restrictions were in compliance with Swiss
law.' 25 Watchmakers and Imperial Chemical were not popular
with foreign governments, and they have drawn substantial
criticism.'
The Advocate-General to the Court of Justice, in his opinion to the Court in Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. EEC
Comm'n, commented that the Watchmakers case "was no
longer a simple application of U.S. law, but a use of coercive
measures aimed at ensuring the forcible execution of the decision outside the territory of the U.S."' 27 The Court of Justice
in Imperial Chemical distinguished between jurisdiction to
declare domestic law applicable, and jurisdiction to enforce
that application abroad. It held that the latter is within the
jurisdiction of the courts of the foreigner's domicile.'
EEC Assertion of ExtraterritorialJurisdiction. The
problems of extraterritorial jurisdiction were examined in a
suit brought by the Commission against four non-EEC dye
manufacturers and six EEC firms for price-fixing.'2 On three
121. Id. at 221-22.
122. 1963 TRADE CAS. 70,600 at 77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), modified, 1965 TRADE
CAS.
71,352 at 80,490 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Watchmakers].
123. 1965 TRADE CAS. 80,491 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
124. Id.
125. Id. at
77,456-57.
126. See FUGATE, supra note 69, at 50 n.28; COMMITTEE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF RESTRICTIVE TRADE LEGISLATION, REPORT OF THE 55TH CONFERENCE OF THE

112 passim (1974). But see id. at 134. See also
(1965).
127. Imperial Chemical, supra note 13, at 8053.
128. Id. at 8008.
129. The Commission in the Dyestuffs cases, supra note 114, charged the following non-EEC firms with violations of Treaty of Rome article 85: Imperial Chemical
Industries, Ltd. (U.K.), and three Swiss firms- J.R. Geigy AG, Ciba AG, and Sandoz

INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 18
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separate occasions over a span of four years, the prices of certain dyes had been raised by the manufacturers by the same
increments and on the same days. 3 ' The four non-EEC firms
claimed that the Commission lacked jurisdiction over them
since the price-fixing arrangement: (1) had no anti-competitive
effect within the Community; (2) was executed outside the
Community; and (3) was not effected in the EEC by the foreign
parent companies, but by their EEC subsidiaries, who were
responsible for their own actions.' 3 They argued, in effect, that
they were foreigners who had committed acts on their own soil,
and that these acts did not affect trade in the EEC. 3 The
Court rejected these theories.'
The Commission argued that the application of an "effects
test" to determine jurisdiction in this type of case had long
been as accepted principle of international law.'34 It conceded
that the 1927 Case of the S.S. "Lotus"'35 considered before the
International Court of Justice, established that the assertion of
extra-territorial jurisdiction is proper only when some of the
"constituent elements, and especially the effects" of the violation, occur within the borders of the state asserting jurisdiction. "' The Commission called this the theory of "objective
territoriality" because of its emphasis on objectively ascertainable states of fact'37 in order to find jurisdiction. 3 '
The Commission argued, however, that this theory was not
suited to violations of competition law because such violations,
in many cases, are not the direct cause of the anticompetitive
effects-as, for instance, where prices rise because the supply
has been withdrawn, and not because manufacturers themselves have raised prices, as was done in the dye industry.
Nor did the Commission wish to endorse the kind of sweeping jurisdictional authority asserted in Alcoa. 9 Its objection to
AG. All of these Court of Justice cases appear in [1971-73 Transfer Binder] CCH
COMM. MKT. REP.
8161 et seq. (Ct. J. 1972).
130. Id. at 8024.
131. Id. at 8006, 8009-10.
132. Id. at 8030-31.
133. And in the process, the Court of Justice presented a brief history of the law
of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Id.
134. Id. at 8007-08.
135. [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9.
136. Imperial Chemical, supra note 13, at 8008.
137. Such a state of fact might consist of the corpus delictus in a homicide case,
or a price rise in a price-fixing case.
138. See Imperial Chemical, supra note 13, at 8008.
139. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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Judge Hand's decision focused on the fact that the price of
aluminum was constantly falling during the cartel's operation,
and that the alleged effect of slowing this fall was indirect and
nearly impossible to show.'40 Thus it commented in Imperial
Chemical, one of the Dyestuffs cases, that Alcoa made it
possible to conclude that any agreement made abroad between foreigners, which restricted competition on the
American market, can be prohibited under U.S. antitrust
law, however indirect, distant, or tenuous the agreement's
relationship to the American market might be.' 4'
In the Dyestuffs cases,' the Commission ostensibly opted
for a narrower theory of jurisdiction situated between the strict
"objective territoriality" test of the Lotus case and the broad
"effects" test of the Alcoa case. It proposed that only "direct
economic effects" were sufficient to confer jurisdiction where
the acts in question were performed by foreigners on foreign
soil.' 43 In conjunction with this test, the Commission then
added that the "protection principle" of keeping economic and
social order at home should be given major consideration because even conduct taking place outside the Community, when
it has effects within, upsets its "public order," represented in
this case by its cartel law. Thus the Community's order was
upset not just by the acts of Imperial Chemical's EEC subsidiaries, but also by its own conduct in giving orders to these
subsidiaries. '
The argument that ICI's conduct outside the Community
conferred jurisdiction in the Community's courts, so long as
there was some effect within, seems to go beyond the middle
ground marked out by the "direct economic effects" test. It
means that even indirect effects caused by a non-EEC supply
cartel seeking to limit exports to the Community could be the
subject of Community jurisdiction, providing the damage to
the public order was sufficient.'45
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Imperial Chemical supra note 13.
143. Id. at 8008-09.
144. Id. at 8008.
145. The Commission qualified the apiplication of the "protection principle" in
this case, however, saying that it sought only fines against Imperial Chemical, not an
injunction forcing the commission of acts outside the Community, nor a subpoena
forcing the production of documents or persons from outside the EEC:
The declaration that [Imperial Chemical's] conduct violates the Treaty
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Alternatively the Commission argued that the non-EEC
firms did not merely "affect" trade between Member States,
but acted within the EEC by requiring their EEC subsidiaries
to raise their prices. According to the Commission, the subsidiaries' act of raising prices was essentially the act of the parent
companies.'
On appeal by the dye manufacturers from the Commission's imposition of fines, 4 ' the Court of Justice upheld the
Commission in all four Dyestuffs cases involving non-EEC
firms.' The precise basis of its holding, however, is unclear.
In answering one firm's challenges to the Commission's jurisdiction over it for acts committed outside the Community, the
Court stated:
. . .Geigy's conduct was manifested within the Common
Market. According to the. . . findings, the price increases
took place in the Common Market and affected competition between producers operating on this market. The acts
for which the fine was imposed are therefore practices carried out directly within the Common Market ...
The Commission's competence [over non-EEC firms for
conduct outside the Community but affecting its trade] is
not based just on the effects of acts committed outside of
the Community, but also on an activity within the Com49
mon Market that can be attributed to Geigy.'
The Court seemed to accept the "effects" test in attributing
the price rises in the Community to the horizontal arrangement
between the dye manufacturers. But the language- "practices
and the imposition of a fine, should not be confused with the actual
enforcement, i.e., with proceedings to enforce the . . . fines through...
seizure. Therein lies the difference between legislative jurisdiction and
enforcement jurisdiction. Under its legislative jurisdiction, a sovereign
power can issue, for its own territory, provisions that will apply even if
the act is committed abroad. On the other hand a sovereign power, in
exercising its enforcement jurisdiction, will sometimes attempt to require
an enterprise to take actions that must be performed abroad.
Imperial Chemical, supra note 13, 8161, at 8012.
146. Id. at 8007.
147. Commission Decision of July 24, 1969, [1967-70 Transfer Binder, New Developments CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9314.
148. See note 129 supra.
149. J.R. Geigy AG v. EEC Comm'n, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM.
MKT.REP.
8164 at 8143 (Ct. J. 1972). The activity referred to as within the EEC was
Geigy's instructions to its EEC subsidiaries to raise dye prices-the price rises effected
by the subsidiaries were attributed to the parent company as acts within the Community. Id.
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carried out directly within the Common Market"-raises the
issue of whether the Court was in fact speaking of acts outside
the Community which affected trade within. Perhaps the
Court was ignoring the "protection principle" and relying on
the Commission's alternative argument that acts of the EEC
subsidiaries could be attributed to the parents as "constituent
elements" of the violation taking place within the Community.5 0 By accepting the Commission's arguments in the
alternative, the Court detracted from the solidity of each. As a
result, it is unclear whether non-EEC firms will in the future
be subjected to Community jurisdiction solely for acts committed outside the EEC.
Thus an agreement that non-EEC businesses will not compete with EEC firms' 5 ' could be effected without any anticompetitive behavior in the Community, despite the fact that
removal of the threat of real and potential competition within
the Common Market would allow those within to raise their
prices. The effect of such an agreement could be just as devastating to competition within the Community as was the
Dyestuffs agreement. But the economic effects of the former
would be an indirect result of the agreement, rather than a
direct result of an activity within the Community. The arguments of the Commission and the Advocates-General in the
Dyestuffs cases indicate that they will argue for extraterritorial jurisdiction in future cases, with the AdvocateGeneral urging the "effects" test, and the Commission arguing
both the "effects" test and the "protection principle." The
Court of Justice will ultimately have to decide which test applies in an appropriate situation.
Application of Article 85 Requires the Use of Agreements,
Decisions, or Concerted PracticesBetween Enterprises
Once jurisdiction based on sufficient effect on trade between EEC states has been found,'52 Article 85 requires a showing that an "agreement . . . decision

.

.

or concerted prac-

150. Imperial Chemical, supra note 13, at 8007, 8031.
151. The participants in the international aluminum cartel, considered in Alcoa,
supra note 30, discussed in text accompanying note 116 supra, agreed to forego competition in the United States.
152. Treaty of Rome art. 85.1, 298 U.N.T.S. 47 (1958), prohibits "agreements
between undertakings . . . by associations of undertakings . . . and concerted practices..." having anticompetitive effects within the Community. The full text of Article 85 is reproduced in app. A infra.
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tice" between business entities exists. Article 85 does not apply
to anticompetitive actions of single enterprises; two or more
concerns must be involved for any of Article 85's prohibitions
to be invoked.'5 3
Article 85 requires the existence of a relationship between
at least two separate legal entities, each with capacity to contract and its own legal personality.'54 An agreement between a
buyer and seller which imposes anticompetitive terms is one
type of agreement subject to control under Article 85.'1 5
A branch or a division of an enterprise is not an "undertaking" itself unless it has the legal capacity to contract in its own
name.' 6 Thus the Court of Justice in a 1968 case, Parke, Davis
& Co. v. Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm,and Centrafarm
Cos.,' 57 held that there was no basis for Commission action
under Article 85 where Parke-Davis had assigned a patent to
its Dutch subsidiary and sought to prevent imports of unpatented goods into the Netherlands. The Court implied that
there could be no "agreement" between a parent and its
wholly-owned subsidiary within the meaning of Article 85.'1s
Commentators have explained the "agreements" requirement as follows:
. . .Article 85.1 is not applicable to agreements between
enterprises of the same concern, for the reason that economically they constitute a single unit and have no life of
their own . . .Any competition [between] them . . .is
not based upon their free determination as entrepreneurs,
but depends upon the will of the concern's management
. .. [It] is merely a method of operation of the concern,
and not the kind of competition protected by Article
85.1.1 59
153. See Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm, & Centrafarm Cos., [1967-70 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8054, at 7825 (Ct. J.
1968) [hereinafter cited as Parke Davis]. See also Conclusions of the Advocate General. Id. at 7828.
154. OBERDORFER, supra note 11, at 8.
155. See, e.g., the use by a manufacturer of restraints on its distributors from
selling outside their assigned territories in Grundig, also OBERDORFER, supra note 11,
at 20-21, for a discussion of the prohibition of some vertical restraints.

156.

OBERDORFER,

supra note 11, at 8.

157. Parke Davis, supra note 153, 8054.
158. Id. at 7825-26. See also Conclusions of the Advocate General. Id. at 7528.
159. OBERDORFER, supra note 11, at 30, adding at note 55 that this view is shared
by the majority of commentators.
The authors utilize section 18 of the German Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporations
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The "concern relationship" is of crucial importance in determining whether an agreement is capable of restraining competition between related firms, and it refers to absolute or nearly
absolute control by one management over that of the affiliates."" Where there is such control, the related companies are
immune from antitrust sanctions under Article 85.111
Intra-EnterpriseConspiracy-Agreements Between Related
Firms
It is not always a simple matter to determine whether
subsidiaries are mere puppets of their parent corporations, and
thus whether agreements between them are outside the scope
of Article 85. There are infinite shadings of independence, and
it is this independence which the law of intra-enterprise conspiracy seeks to protect.
The intra-enterprise conspiracy theory was first utilized in
'
the American cases of United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 62
Act) of 1965 to help distinguish between "undertakings" or "enterprises" on the one
hand, and "concerns" on the other:
1. If a dominant and one or more dependent enterprises are joined under
the uniform management of the dominant enterprise, then they constitute a concern; the individual enterprises are concern enterprises. If there
is a contract of domination between enterprises or if one enterprise is
integrated into the other they are to be considered under a uniform management. It is presumed that the dependent enterprise forms a concern
with the dominant enterprise.
2. If legally independent enterprises are joined together under a uniform
management without one enterprise being dependent on. the other, then
they also constitute a concern; the individual enterprises are concern
enterprises.
Id. at 9.
160. The Court of Justice in the Dyestuffs cases, supra note 114, found such a
relationship between non-EEC parent companies and their EEC affiliates:
The fact that the subsidiary has its own legal personality does not serve
to rule out the possibility that its conduct is attributable to the parent
company. This could be the case where the subsidiary, even though it has
its own legal personality, does not . . . independently determine its own
market behavior but essentially follows the instructions given to it by the
parent company. If the subsidiary does not in fact have autonomy in
determining its course of conduct on the market, the prohibition of Article 85.1 is inapplicable to the relationship between it and the parent
company with which it forms an economic unity. Since an affiliated
group so structured forms a unity, the parent company can, under certain
circumstances, be held responsible.
Imperial Chemical, supra note 13, at 8031.
161. But see Treaty of Rome art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 48-49 (1958), which is applicable where a dominant concern abuses its position.
162. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
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Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,' 3 and KieferStewart Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons.'64 In all of these cases,
conspiracies to restrain trade between parent companies and
their affiliates were found, even in Kiefer-Stewart, where the
conspiracy was between Seagram and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Calvert.'65 As the Supreme Court said in Yellow Cab,
[An unreasonable restraint of trade] may result as readily
from a conspiracy among those who are affiliated or integrated under common ownership as from a conspiracy between those who are otherwise independent

. .

. The cor-

porate interrelationships of the conspirators, in other
words, are not determinative of the applicability of the
Sherman Act.' 6
But the use of the intra-enterprise conspiracy theory to find
antitrust violations for restrictive agreements between parent
and subsidiary corporations, both in the EEC and the U.S.,
will occur only when a normally autonomous subsidiary joins
with its parent in anticompetitive conduct. Where the subsidiary is a mere appendage of a parent, there is no prohibition on
cooperation unless the enterprises are dominant or monopolistic.'6 7
Thus, aside from considerations of dominance or monopoly, EEC and American antitrust policies encourage internal
corporate growth.'68
163. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
164. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
165. Compare Keifer-Stewart with the Commission's Decision of June 18, 1969,
granting a negative clearance to the Danish firm Christiani and Nielson N.V. Christiani concluded contracts with its subsidiaries in the Netherlands, Germany, and
France, exclusively allocating each of those markets to the respective firms. The Commission justified the arrangement by stressing, inter alia, that the parent company
"would be able to determine at any time the behavior of the subsidiaries
in which it
held all of the capital." Commission Decision of June 18, 1969, [1965-69 Transfer
Binder, New Developmentsj CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9308, at 8659. See text accompanying note 159 supra.

166. 332 U.S. at 227.
167.

See Treaty of Rome art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 48-49 (1958). The text of Article

86 is reproduced in app. B infra, and its substance is more fully discussed in text

accompanying note 272 infra. Article 86 prohibits abuses of dominant position; in the
United States, Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), outlaws most monopolies and
attempts to monopolize, while Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly ch.
25, § 7, 38 Stat. 631 (1914), prohibits mergers and acquisitions which "may . . .
substantially lessen competition, or . . . tend to create a monopoly."
168. See, e.g., the Commission's grant of a negative clearance to Christiani &
Nielsen N.V. Commission Decision of June 18, 1969, [1965-69 Transfer Binder, New
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Commentators have pointed out, however, that the Court
of Justice may in future antitrust cases treat affiliated enterprises as it does independent ones, making use of intraenterprise conspiracy law.' The 1961 Court of Justice
Schrottausgleischekasse decision, in which steel companies
were ordered to contribute to a "scrap equalization fund" in
order to keep the price of scrap down, is cited to support this
proposition. 7 " Each "enterprise" in the industry was ordered to
contribute. When it came time to pay, parent companies contended that their subsidiaries were not enterprises themselves,
but were instead part of the parents' enterprises. The Court
rejected this argument, saying that since each of the companies
had chosen the particular legal form most advantageous to it,
there was no reason to disregard this form when it proved
disadvantageous to the companies.'
The conclusion that this 1961 decision-may pave the way
for the Court of Justice to treat affiliated enterprises as it does
independent ones under EEC law is dubious. This case was
governed by the Treaty of Paris, "' which created a Common
Market for the sale of coal and steel. In recent cases under the
Treaty of Rome, the Court has made it clear that even where
the subsidiary has some autonomy, Article 85 is inapplicable
since there is no competition to be foreclosed between the
two.'

73

Developments] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9308; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293 (1949); note 183 infra.
In Standard, the United States Supreme Court viewed Standard's requirements
contracts with its independent stations as unreasonable restraints of trade. Justice
Douglas dissented, saying that the requirements contracts had allowed the small,
independent station owners to remain in business. 337 U.S. at 315. Alternatively, he
argued, it was Standard which had derived the greatest benefit from the contracts. But
whether the invalidation of the contracts forced many independents out of business
by destabilizing their supplies, or Standard felt that the requirements terms were
essential, the effect of the decision may have been to encourage it to replace the
independents with its own agents.
In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), the Court may
again have encouraged Schwinn to enlarge its own distribution network so as to circumvent the Court's disapproval of its relations with its independent distributors.
169. OBERDORFER, supra note 11, at 31.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18,
1951, U.N.T.S. 142, 261
173. The Commission reached a similar conclusion recently in levying heavy
fines on Commercial Solvents Corporation (CSC, U.S.). CSC and its Italian subsidiary, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. (ICI), had a near-monopoly over a base
chemical used to produce an anti-Tuberculosis drug. ICI refused to sell the chemical
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It appears that unless a subsidiary can act independently
of its parent on most matters, the parent will be held liable for
the subsidiary's illegal conduct, and without this independence
there will be no possibility of a restrictive agreement or concerted practice between the parties. The theory is useful in
some respects: the Commission was conveniently able to gain
extraterritorial jurisdiction in some cases by holding the nonEEC parents liable for the subsidiaries' acts within the Community.' But it is a positive hindrance in cases of intraenterprise restraints solely within the Community, for purposes
of applying Article 85. Only where a firm of one concern cooperates with a firm of another concern is Article 85 applicable to
the parent companies.' 75 Where the cooperation is between
firms of one business entity, these subsidiaries may be free to
affect markets as they wish from within the corporate veil. 76
In Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,'77 an
American case, Seagram and Calvert had held themselves out
as competitors. Seagram in fact fully-owned Calvert and influenced the latter to join in a price fixing scheme for which both
were forced to pay damages.' 78 Under EEC law, 7 ' Seagram and
Calvert would be permitted to continue in this arrangement
since, in the view of the Commission and Court, there would
be no competition between them capable of elimination.""
to the Italian firm Zoja subsequent to the breakdown of merger talks between them.
Commission Decision of Dec. 14, 1972, [1973-75 Transfer Binder, New Developmentsl
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9543, at 9215-3, a/I'd, Commercial Solvents Corp. v. EEC
Comm'n, [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8209 (Ct. J. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as Commercial Solvents]. The Commission, in finding against CSC
for an abuse of dominant position under Article 86, noted that CSC owned fifty-one
percent of ICI's capital, appointed half of its directors, and CSC's board chairman also
headed ICI. [1973-75 Transfer Binder, New Developments] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9543 (EEC Comm'n 1972), at 9215-4. The Commission made no mention of any agreement or concerted practice between CSC and ICI under Article 85, so it can be inferred
that the Commission presumed that no foreclosure of competition between CSC and
ICI was possible. [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8209. See also note
160 supra.
174. See, e.g., Commercial Solvents, supra note 173.
175. This was the situation in the Dyestuffs cases, supra note 114, with cooperation between many non-EEC concerns via their EEC subsidiaries. See also note 159
and accompanying text supra for further discussion of concern relationships.
176. See text accompanying note 159 supra.
177. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
178. 340 U.S. at 212.
179. See Treaty of Rome art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 47-48 (1958).
180. See, e.g., the negative clearance granted Christiani & Nielsen N.V., Commission Decision of June 18, 1969, [1965-69 Transfer Binder, New Developments
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9308; text accompanying note 159 supra.
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Both the EEC and the United States encourage internal
growth by allowing greater latitude in setting trading conditions with subsidiaries, as opposed to independent distributors.'8 ' But the EEC's sparing use of its antimonopoly legislation,8 2 along with the fact that in no case has it used the intraenterprise conspiracy theory to find a violation of Article 85, is
by far the stronger incentive to the growth of large concentrations of economic power. 3 This may be acceptable in light of
the Community desire to promote rapid growth in its industries
so as to enable them to compete in world markets." 4 In
American antitrust law, on the other hand, economic pluralism
is both a goal and a central safeguard to economic and political
liberty.'85 The intra-enterprise conspiracy concept has been
used quite often to promote these goals.
Concerted Practices
Article 85's prohibition of "concerted practices. . . which
distort competition . . ." refers to cooperation between enter-

prises. A concerted practice falls short of a binding contract or
agreement, and lies somewhere between a conscious parallelIn the Dyestuifs cases, supra note 114, no concerted practice between parent
companies and their subsidiaries was found when the former ordered the latter to raise
prices. See also Commercial Solvents, supra note 173, discussed in text accompanying
note 288 infra.
181. Compare BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL, DEVELOPING DISTRIBUTION IN EUROPEMARKETING POINTERS To PROFITS IN THE SEVENTIES 6 (1969), with dissent of Justice

Douglas in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315 (1949).
182. Treaty of Rome art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 48-49 (1958). See note 85 supra;
FUGATE, supra note 69, at 476-77.
183. Director-General Schelieder of the Directorate General for Competition has
in fact admitted that the Commission can do nothing to check internal growth. Nor,
he added, is there any power to halt conglomerate mergers extending a company's
influence without giving it a dominant position in any one product market. Wall Street
Journal, April 25, 1973, at 31, col. 3; see also Commission response to Written Question
No. 385/75, [1973-75 Transfer Binder, New Developments] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9794 (Dec. 13, 1975). But see Commission Decision of Dec. 17, 1975, 2 CCH COMM.
9800, discussed in note 85 supra, in which the Commission thought it
MKT. REP.
appropriate to consider the fact that the conglomerate United Brands Corp. had $2
billion in revenues worldwide, in determining the size of the fine to be imposed for
violations of Article 86.
For American cases condemning conglomerate mergers, see F.T.C. v.
Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 649 (1965); F.T.C. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386
U.S. 568 (1967).
184. See note 51 supra.
185. See Standard Oil v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 318-19 (1949) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
186. See OBERDORFER, supra note 11, at 14-15.
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ism on the one hand, where firms act identically, though without agreement, and a gentlemen's agreement on the other,
where parties agree without creating legally binding commitments.'87 Not all cooperation is prohibited, however. There are
many cases in which Community authorities encourage cooperation by the issuance of group exemptions' 8 and policy announcements clarifying the Commission's view of certain practices.' 9 But when cooperation shades into the anticompetitive,
it is prohibited. Further, a parallelism can be a concerted practice
where it leads to competitive conditions that are not, considering the relevant fact, normal market conditions. This
is the case where parallel conduct makes it possible to
achieve price stability at a level other than that which
would have resulted from competition and to strengthen
acquired market position to the detriment of really free
trade within the EEC. ....0
.

Thus, where prices for dyes produced by ten different manufacturers repeatedly rose in every EEC state at the same times
and by the same increments, the inference of collusion was
reasonable. 9 ' Where European drug companies controlled pro187. Id. American courts have rejected the "conscious parallelism" concept for
the purpose of proving violations of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Theatre Enterprises,
Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Co., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954). See also 1 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP.
2111.25 (1973).
188. Exemptions are provided for in Treaty of Rome art. 85.3, 298 U.N.T.S. 48
(1958). The Council granted the Commission the power to exempt groups of agreements in its Regulation 19/65, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2717 (1971).
189. See, e.g., the Notice of May 27, 1970, relating to Agreements, Decisions, and
Concerted Practices of Minor Importance, [1970-72 Transfer Binder, New Developmentsl CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9367, at 8793 [hereinafter cited as Notice on Agreements of Minor Importancej. In issuing the Notice, the Commission sought to promote
cooperation between small and medium-sized firms. Id.
190. Imperial Chemical, supra note 13, at 8027. See also OBERDORFER, supra note
11, at 16, for the proposition that "Article 85 is directed, not against the means, but
against the result, i.e., the concerted conduct. The manner of 'concerting' is immaterial . . . ."
191. Imperial Chemical, supra note 13, at 8024, 8027. A similar case was presented in the Commission Decision of July 23, 1974, [1973-75 Transfer Binder, New
Developmentsl CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9668, in which four major Belgian wallpaper
manufacturers notified the Commission (under Article 85.3) of a limited 1962 agreement between them for the improvement of production and distribution. In seeking
the exemption, they made no mention of many terms of the agreement fixing prices
and general sales terms (including secret rebates to customers who purchased large
quantities from the four), and group boycotts against customers who did not follow
their rules. Id. at 9493-94. Upon investigation, the Commission learned of these practices and imposed a fine of 430,000 units of account, calling it "one of the most serious"
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duction of the raw material for quinine, and the base chemical's price multiplied ten times within two years,'92 suspicions
of conspiracy were well-founded.' 3
All forms of cooperation ate not viewed as conspiracies or
illegal concerted practices, however. The Commission favors
cooperation which utilizes reso.rces more efficiently,'94 in some
cases even when that cooperation violates Article 85.1.'11 But
the distinction between cooperation and concerted action to
restrain trade is often a fine one. The facts of United States v.
Container Corp. of America 9 ' present a good example of this
problem. The Justice Department charged that corrugated
container manufacturers accounting for 90 per cent of the industry's sales had conspired to fix prices. The essence of the
cooperation was the existence of informal reciprocal agreements to release, on request, price information on individual
transactions. There were no explicit agreements to set prices at
fixed levels, only, ostensibly, to exchange the price information. Justice Douglas, writing for the Supreme Court, found a
conspiracy to fix prices. ' Although prices were decreasing,
they had been "stabilized," according to the Court, and so
decreased perhaps more slowly and with more order than they
might have.
98
citing the low cost
The dissent in Container Corporation,'
of entry into the industry, viewed that industry as competitive
despite the fact that 18 manufacturers virtually controlled the
market.'99 Justice Marshall argued in his dissent that smaller
producers would more readily use the price information to uninfringements of Community competition law, in determining the size of the fines. Id.
at 9493-98.
192. Opening Statement by Senator Phillip Hart, Hearings on the Prices of
Quinine and Quinidine Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 2 (1966).
193. Commission Decision of Jun 16, 1969, [1965-69 Transfer Binder, New Developmentsl CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9313. The Commission imposed a fine of nearly
500,000 units of account on five firms. See note 209 infra for a discussion of the unit of
account.
194. Many such arrangements are termed "rationalization" agreements. See
OBERDORFER, supra note 11, at 87.
195. For example, exemptions are granted for those practices which would contravene Article 85.1, were it not for their beneficial effects. See OBERDORFER, supra note
11, at 81.
196. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
197. Id. at 337-38.
198. Justices Harlan and Stewart joined in the dissent, written by Justice Marshall. Id. at 340.
199. Id. at 342-43.
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dercut their competition in each transaction, than as the
means of a conspiracy to match the prices of those competitors.
He also pointed to the trial court's finding that when the companies stopped the price exchanges, prices remained essentially unchanged, and in a few cases actually rose.""0
Assuming that exchange of price information is not per se
illegal under the Sherman Act,'' nor under Article 85, the issue
in such cases becomes whether the cooperation is "liable to
affect trade" in a restrictive fashion. 2 ' Had the same situation
occurred in the EEC, the stabilization of prices through exchanges would more likely have been approved. While in the
United States the emphasis on economic pluralism leads antitrust authorities to frown upon cooperation because of its detrimental effect on potential competition,0 3 EEC authorities encourage cooperation to promote "rationalization" of production
and distribution.'"4 The Commission has declared that cooperation agreements providing for centralized invoicing and distribution, especially in oligopolistic industries, are the most
200. Id. at 344-45.
201. Id. at 337. Justice Douglas did not say that the exchange of price information is illegal per se. He said that the agreements to exchange information were the
initial ingredient in determining whether a price-fixing conspiracy existed. Id. at 335.
Justice Fortas concurred with the understanding that the decision did not signal per
se illegality of exchange agreements. Id. at 339-40.
202. Treaty of Rome art. 85.1, 298 U.N.T.S. 47-48 (1958).
203. The Commission set forth its views on price information agreements in its
Notice on Agreements, Decisions, and Concerted Practices Concerning Cooperation
Between Enterprises, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2699 (1971):
Agreements whose sole purpose is the joint procurement of information which the various enterprises need to determine their future market
behavior freely and independently . . . do not have as their object or
effect the restriction of competition. But if the . . . behavior is coordinated either expressly or through concerted practices, there may be a
restraint of competition. This is in particular the case where concrete
recommendations are made or where conclusions are given such a form
that they induce at least some of the participating enterprises to behave
in an identical manner in the market.
Id. at 1848.
204. See, e.g., the Commission's grant of an exemption under Article 85.3 for a
market allocation agreement for any products which might come of joint research
between the largest ammunition manufacturers in France (La Cartoucherie Francaise)
and Belgium (Fabrique Nationale d'Armes de Guerre). The Commission explained
that the plan, by allowing a more intensive and rational use of the parties' resources,
would yield products of higher quality at lower prices, and would not eliminate competition due to the presence of other sizeable competitors. Commission Decision of May
28, 1971, [1970-72 Transfer Binder, New Developments] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9439.
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suspect." 5 Thus the Commission likely would have viewed the
American container industry practices as relatively tame because of the lack of such centralization.
Article 85 Does Not ProhibitAll Restrictive Agreements
The Commission's endorsement of cooperation comes in
many forms. First, the Commission's use of the "appreciable
restraint" theory grants small and medium-sized firms virtually unrestricted freedom.2"' Second, the negative clearance
procedure2" ' serves to reassure enterprises that their practices
do not come within the prohibitions of Articles 85 and 86.
Third, the Commission grants "exemptions" under Article 85.3
for admittedly restrictive practices which are accepted because
they result in more efficient production and distribution, and
in lower costs or higher-quality products.
The "appreciable" restraint theory was introduced as policy by the Commission in 1970, when it declared that only those
practices having "perceptible" effects on third parties in the
EEC were covered by Article 85.208 Where the enterprises in
question account for less than five per cent of the relevant
product market, and their annual revenues are less than fifteen
million units of account,2 9 the Commission assumes that the
enterprises involved are incapable of perceptibly affecting
21 0
trade in the Community.
205. Notice on Agreements, Decisions, and Concerted Practices Concerning Cooperation Between Enterprises, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2699 (1971).
206. See, e.g., Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, supra note 189, at
8794.
207. Council Regulation 17, art. 2, provides that at, the request of concerned
firms, the Commission may find that there are "no grounds for it to intervene with
respect to an agreement, decision, or practice." 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2411 (1973).
208. Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, supra note 189, at 8794.
209. Id. For distributors, the annual revenues must be less than twenty-million
units of account. Id. A unit of account was formerly set as a fraction of a gram of gold,
roughly equivalent to one U.S. dollar, and used as the Community's unit of accounting
for international trade. See Regulation 17, art. 18, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1I 2571,
2572.01 (1973). It is now calculated daily by the Commission, according to the prevailing exchange rates of the nine EEC currencies. [1972-75 Transfer Binder, New Developments] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9739 (1975).
210. Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, supra note 189, at 8794-95.
A corollary of the appreciable restraint theory is that there must be a restraint of
either existing or potential competition. As discussed above, it is assumed that there
is no competition between a parent company and its wholly-owned subsidiary. Similarly, horizontal agreements are allowed where no competition between the parties is
possible. An example of this is the Commission's Decision of May 5, 1969, 11967-70
Transfer Binder, New Developmentsl CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9303. This decision
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Negative clearances for practices not restraining
competition. The negative clearance procedure permits the
Commission, on request, to assure private parties of its disinterest in their activities for antitrust purposes.2 ' A noted authority has stated that the negative clearance procedure
allows undertakings or associations of undertakings, whenever the agreements in which they participate . . . in their
opinion, provide no ground for Commission intervention
under Article 85.1 (or 86) to ask the Commission to confirm
this officially.
22
Once the Commission grants a negative clearance, the concerned parties are assured that the conduct examined by the
Commission will not be grounds for a fine, unless the Commission later decides on the basis of new information that the
practices in question are anticompetitive." 3
Most of the Commission's work in the competition field
comes under the negative clearance procedure, since an application for a negative clearance is a denial of any wrongdoing,
while an application for an exemption under Article 85.3 is an
admission of possible antitrust wrongs which are considered to
be outweighed by their benefits." 4
involved a 1936 agreement between Belgian natural cement producers [Limeburnersl
and their artificial cement counterparts, which provided that the Limeburners would
limit their production of natural cement in return for annual payments of 0.5% of the
sales revenues for artificial cement. Id. at 8650-51. In 1962 both groups "noticed" their
agreement to the Commission for a negative clearance, and the cement producers
curtailed their payments to the Limeburners, claiming that the agreement was in
violation of Article 85.1. Id. at 8651.
The Commission granted the negative clearance, reasoning that the Limeburners
were so small and diminishing a competitive force (since the production of artificial
cement is more efficient, and the end product is of higher quality than the older
product), that the restriction of their production presented no threat to competition
since they could provide little or none at their full capacity. Id. at 8653.
211. See notes 75-76 supra.
212. Marchini-Camia, supra note 43.
213. OBERDORFER, supra note 11, at 141. The Commission may revoke a negative
clearance only on the basis of "new information" coming to its attention, i.e., the
clearance is good only as to the facts of which the Commission is cognizant. See
Regulation 17, art. 2, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2411 (1973). See also United States
Justice Department's Business Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1975).
Regulation 17, art. 5, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2541 (1972), provides for fines
for misrepresentations in negative clearance applications. See OBERDORFER, supra note
11, at 140. National authorities are, however, deprived of competence to prosecute
recipients of negative clearances by Regulation 17, art. 9. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
2481 (1971).
214. See text accompanying note 215 infra.

1976]

EEC ANTITRUST LAW

Exemptions-Article 85.3. Exemptions are provided for in
Treaty Article 85.3,211 Council Regulation 17,211 and Commission Regulation 27.217 Once application for an exemption is
made, the applying parties are immune from fines for the activities in question until and unless the Commission denies an
exemption." Article 85.3 provides that the proscriptions of
Article 85.1 can be declared inapplicable where the agreement,
decision, or concerted practice (1) improves production or distribution, or promotes technical or economic progress; (2) allows consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits; (3) does
not impose restrictions unnecessary to the attainment of the
first two objectives; and (4) does not enable elimination of
competition in respect of a substantial share of the market."'
215. Treaty of Rome art. 85.3, 298 U.N.T.S. 48 (1958).
2431-2501 (1971).
216. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
217. Id.at 2651 (1971).
218. See Regulation 17, art. 15, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2541, at 1776 (1973).
219. Treaty of Rome art. 85.3, 298 U.N.T.S. 48 (1958). Article 85.3 is the analogue to the American "Rule of Reason," whereby the courts balance the anticompetitive effects of agreements against their possible advantages. It was introduced in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Justice Brandeis explained the rule's
application in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918):
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.
To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied . . ..
The per se illegalities in American antitrust law, on the other hand, are not viewed
with such favorable considerations:
There are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
American courts have used the per se unreasonableness test to avoid inquiry into
an agreement's function, purpose, or effect-once the market share affected by the
agreement in question is shown to be substantial (i.e., beyond de minimis), the use,
e.g., of horizontal agreements to fix prices, allocate geographic markets, or to boycott-are automatically seen as illegal.
The criteria used in Common Market antitrust cases under Article 85.1 can closely
approach the American tests for per se wrongs. This is true if, as argued above (see
text accompanying note 91 supra), there is no need for a showing of adverse effect on
trade in all cases.
Where the practice is shown to be "capable of" or "liable to" have an adverse
effect on trade, and the object or aim of the practice is to have that effect, a violation
of Article 85.1 will have been shown. Proof of the capability of a particular practice to
have an adverse effect on trade is drawn from an analysis of the particular industry's

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

Community law gives a powerful incentive to businesses to
report possibly restrictive agreements to the Commission, so as
to gain the possible advantages offered by the exemption proce220
dure.
The granting of negative clearances and exemptions has
proved a major tool in making the Commission an effective
enforcement agency. These procedures encourage firms to report their agreements and so conserve much of the Commission's time, which would otherwise be spent in investigations.
Cases in which applications for negative clearances and exemptions have been false or misleading have resulted in extremely
heavy fines for the false reports.22" ' It is possible that many more
of these deceptive applications have been made and remain
undiscovered. But the threat of heavy fines, plus the possibility
of approval under Article 85.3 for practices which could result
in fines or private damage suits if unreported, may moderate
the temptation to test the Commission's limited resources.
The Commission has also found other advantages to the
exemption and negative clearance procedures. Especially important is the fact that in many cases it has conditioned the
grant of exemptions and clearances upon the applying parties'
structure-is it highly concentrated and oligopolistic, or monopolistic? Or is competition keen? What is the status of the firm utilizing the practice? Is it a new company
trying to break into a market, or a failing company?
The EEC rules depart from the parallel to American law with its per se rules in
that the "business excuses" mentioned above are always relevant under Community
law.
But the balancing of the anticompetitive effects of these practices against their
possible advantages under Article 85.3 is available only to those firms which apply for
exemptions. Regulation 17(4), (5). CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
2531, 2541 (1971). Once
the Commission initiates proceedings for antitrust law violations, the flexibility of
paragraph three is inapplicable:
Not every kind of concerted restraint on competition will influence interstate trade merely unfavorably; on the contrary, interstate trade will
often be promoted at the same time. Article 85.1 is, however, applicable
even in that case, and its applicability does not depend upon a balancing
of unfavorable and favorable effects (which would mean a kind of rule of
reason). Rather, it is only under Article 85.3, i.e., in granting exemptions,
that there may be an examination of the question whether the concerned
action involved will also promote interstate trade and whether this will
outweigh or at least balance the adverse effects.
OBEHDOHFEa, supra note 11, at 38.
220. One such advantage is immunity from suit by the Commission or national
antitrust authorities once application is made. See Council Regulation 17, arts. 9(3),
15(5)(a). CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
2481, 2541 (1973).
221. See, e.g., the fines imposed on the Belgian Wallpaper Cartel, Commission
Decision of July 23, 1974, [1972-75 Transfer Binder, New Developmentsl CCH COMM.
MKT. REP.
9668 (1974).
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willingness to modify their behavior so as to conform to Commission policies.222
The flexibility offered by Article 85.3 has prompted the
Commission to grant exemptions for (1) territorial protection
agreements for exclusive distributorships;223 (2) specialization
agreements (where two or more enterprises give up some of
their production to another or others in return for assurance of
continued supply of the goods given up);224 (3) agreements to
cooperate in research and development;225 and (4) horizontal
cooperation agreements providing for common marketing and
storage of products. 26 Article 85.1 has been declared inapplicable to these types of agreements because of the advantages
conferred on the respective firms and consumers. These are not
the only agreements eligible for exemption; any practice or
agreement which meets the terms of Article 85.1 is eligible.2
Exclusive distributorships. In 1973, the Commission
granted an exemption to Bayerische Motoren Werke A.G.
(BMW) for exclusive distributor arrangements in which the
distributors agreed not to sell to any but authorized BMW
222. Jones, supra note 38, at 22. In many cases the Commission and Court take
special note of whether the firms they deal with are cooperative and ready to adjust
to the Commission's wishes. It is on this basis in many cases that the Commission and
Court determine the size of fines or the grant of exemptions and negative clearances.
See, e.g., note 295 infra.
The grant of an exemption or negative clearance is not without its disadvantages,
however. In some cases the Commission will make the grant, but require periodic
reports on the status of the specific industries and participating companies:
Obviously, this reporting requirement will present a nuisance and continuing threat for the parties. The conditional nature of these . . . exemptions may suggest that one is better advised to tailor his activities to
fall within a group exemption, so that contact with the Commission can
be avoided altogether. In my judgement, the adage "out of sight, out of
mind" deserves serious consideration when one is contemplating notification.
Jones, supra note 38, at 26. For a similar view regarding the American business review
procedure, see 44 ABA ANTITRUST SEcTION 387 (1975).
223. See, e.g., the exemption granted to Bayerische Motoren Werke AG (BMW),
11972-75 Transfer Binder, New Developments] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9701 (EEC
Comm'n 1974), discussed in text accompanying notes 228-30 infra.
224. See, e.g., the exemption granted to Peter-Uhren GmbH and Jaz S.A.,
[1965-69 Transfer Binder, New Developments] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9317 (EEC
Comm'n 1969), discussed in text accompanying notes 231-32 infra.
225. See, e.g., the exemption granted to the Transocean Marine Paint Ass'n,
11965-69 Transfer Binder, New Developments] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9188 (EEC
Comm'n 1967), discussed in text accompanying notes 233-37 infra [hereinafter cited
as Transocean].
226. Id.
227. OBERDORFER, supra note 11, at 50.
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dealers."' BMW agreed to supply only the exclusive distributors. In return, BMW required that its distributors meet minimum sales figures based on their territories, and provide service of a given quality. The Commission found that this arrangement restrained trade by preventing parallel imports and purchases directly from BMW. And by selecting a small number
of authorized dealers, many who met BMW's qualitative standards were excluded. However, the exemption was granted because the Commission felt that in the case of "high quality"
products, exclusive distribution systems benefit manufacturers, sales agencies, and consumers by allowing streamlined distribution.22 9 Consumers share in these benefits, the Commission reasoned, because qualified, experienced dealers and distributors with well-stocked parts inventories can provide full
aftersale service. Additionally, the small number of distributors was seen as justified by the high price of the product, and
the limited demand for it in each area: BMW was assured
under this type of arrangement that each of its distributors
and dealers would get enough business to finance the provision
of high-quality service.23 0
Specialization agreements. In 1969, the Commission
granted an exemption to Jaz S.A., Paris, and Peter-Uhren,
Rottweil, Germany, for a specialization and reciprocal exclusive supply agreement."' By its terms, Jaz was to specialize in
the production of electric clocks, Peter in large mechanical
clocks. Each would supply the other exclusively in the partner's country with its product at the best price offered to third
parties. In addition, each would commit itself to buy minimum
quantities from the other. The Commission found that the contract restrained each party's freedom of action because it discouraged each from producing and marketing the articles in
which the other specialized."2 Potential competition in these
articles was restrained, and distributors were able to obtain the
clocks only from Jaz and Peter; consequently, trade between
Member States was restrained in a manner prohibited by Arti228. [1972-75 Transfer Binder, New Developments] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9701 (1975).
229. Id. at 9539-4 to 9539-11. BMW's qualitative standards included adequate
pre-sale and after-sales service, qualified personnel, and sound financial standing.
230. Id. at 9539-10 to 9539-11.
231. [1965-69 Transfer Binder, New Developments] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1
9317 (1969).
232. Id. at 8707.
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cle 85.1. Consonant with the requirements of Article 85.3, however, the restrictive terms were found to be indispensible to the
aims of the agreement, which were to rationalize production
and yield lower prices. Thus, neither Jaz nor Peter would have
relinquished its market share in either product had it not been
assured a good source for the clock it ceased to manufacture.
And, lastly, for the requirements of Article 85.3, the agreement
would not bring about a substantial elimination of competition
in the clock market. Though Jaz is France's leading manufacturer of clocks, its share of the EEC market is only five percent.
Peter competes with more than 90 manufacturers in Germany
and is fifth in gross sales there.
Agreements for joint marketing, research, and
development. In 1967, the Commission granted an exemption
to the Transocean Marine Paint Association.233 The Association
consists of 18 medium-sized manufacturers of paints used to
coat ships. The members operate in six of the nine EEC states,
plus the United States, Japan, Panama, Australia, and elsewhere.
The aim of the Association, according to its members, was
to allow competition with the large, international marine paint
firms which can manufacture and stock coatings demanded by
the ship industry.2 34 A complete stock of these paints is necessary in every port, they argued, since new coatings perform well
only if they are of the same composition and quality as the ones
they are to cover. Separately, the members of Transocean
argued, they could not produce and stock as wide a spectrum
of these products as the major firms. Thus the cooperation
brought about by Transocean would allow the members to
compete with large firms by making it possible to offer all of
the necessary coatings in the many ports served by its members.
In addition, the Association would promote the development of special paints by collectively using the research and
experience of each company. The members agreed to produce
these special paints by identical formulas, selling them with
uniform packaging, and under the same trademark. Further,
the exemption allowed the association to require members
holding patents which could increase the sales of Transocean
233. [1965-69 Transfer Binder, New Developments] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 11
9188 (1967), rev'd, [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8241 (Ct. J. 1974).
234. Id. at 8397-98.
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members to offer licenses first to those firms. Each firm was

allowed to set its own prices for Transocean paints. Each could
fill orders outside its own territory, but had to pay a commission to the member established in that territory. Finally, new
members could be admitted only by unanimous approval,
while 'old members could be expelled only by a two-thirds
235

vote.

The Commission found that the agreement was one whose
object and effect was to restrict competition within the Community. 23' The terms of the agreement placed members exporting their paints to the territory of another member at a competitive disadvantage, since the exporters were compelled to pay
commissions to the member established there. Thus trade
between Member States was discouraged. In addition, the requirement that members holding patents which could be of use
in the marine paint industry first offer them to Transocean
members if they wished to license, restrained their freedom to
look for the best terms for these licenses, and restricted the
possibility that non-member firms might obtain them.
The Commission, however, found that the agreement satisfied the requirements of Article 85.3, and permitted it to
stand. 2z: First, the Commission pointed out that the agreement
helped bring about a rationalization of production and distribution of the paints, because it eliminated duplication and
enabled member firms to increase their sales by means of "contract territories"; without the agreement, each member would
be forced to establish complete facilities and supplies in many
235. Id. at 8398. A similar arrangement was attempted in this country.
Small
and medium-sized grocery firms sought to collectively produce and
market privatelabel goods using territorial restraints much like those in Transocean,
supra note 225.
Their aim was to compete with the giants of the American grocery
industry. The
arrangement was condemned by the U.S. Supreme Court. It said that
this scheme of
horizontally imposed territorial restraints was a per se illegal restraint
of trade since
it effectively restricted price competition. United States v. Topco Associates,
Inc., 405
U.S. 596 (1972). See also Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S.
1 (1945). In this
case the Court upheld an order enjoining enforcement of an association
bylaw which
allowed members to veto the membership application of any competitor.
236. Transocean, supra note 225, at 8399-400.
237. Id. The Commission, while granting the exemption, imposed
extensive reporting obligations on Transocean's members. For example, changes in membership
must be reported, as well as amendments to the agreement, and all
decisions of the
association interpreting the agreement. In addition, the members must
report annually
on the association's activities and sales. Id. at 8403-04. One commentator,
considering
these requirements, noted, "[iln my judgment, the adage 'out of sight,
out of mind'
deserves serious consideration when one is contemplating notification."
Jones, supra
note 38, at 26.
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ports so as to compete with the larger firms. The Commission
held that this would constitute too large an investment and too
great a risk for medium-sized firms, since they would be forced
to set up branches or agencies to maintain warehouses and
after-sales service. In addition, consumers benefitted from the
agreement because the supply of marine paints was greater,
and those who used Transocean paints would no longer be
forced to carry them on board, wasting valuable cargo space.
Another consideration mentioned was that the allowance of
exports from one member's territory to that of another maintained some price competition despite the payment of commissions. Finally, the Commission saw the restrictive terms of the
agreement as indispensible to its success23 because the
territorial protection terms, though admittedly restraining
price competition among members, induced them to promote
vigorously the sale of Transocean paints by concentrating their
efforts mainly in their own territories. Thus customers in each
of the member's territories would be assured of regular, complete stocks, since the companies would not be stuck with excess supplies as a result of encroachments and consequent competition with others.
This was the first exemption granted for an international,
horizontal agreement. 3 ' Unfortunately the Commission, in its
announcement of the exemption, did not discuss the market
shares held by Transocean members, so as to protect confidential commercial information.2 4 As a result, it is difficult to
predict with any certainty which horizontal agreements will
qualify for exemptions in the future. One commentator has
warned that "notwithstanding Transocean, which is an exceptional case, attempts to reserve national markets to local producers are generally very dangerous, whatever the device
used."2 4' More recently the Commission has attempted to narrow the Transocean exemption, 42 casting into doubt the future
238. Article 85.3(a), Treaty of Rome art. 85.3(a), 298 U.N.T.S. 48 (1958), conditions the grant of an exemption on the absence of all unnecessarily restrictive terms.
239. OBERDORFER, supra note 11, at 99. Horizontal agreements are those between
firms which are on the same market level, i.e., production, distribution, and sales.
240. Id.
241. Jones, supra note 38, at 23.
242. In 1973 the Commission renewed the Transocean exemption, but it added
new conditions. First, it specified that members should not be forced to pay commissions for sales in another's territory; second, that it be informed not only of changes in
the association's membership, but also of any interlocking directorships involving the
association or its members with other trade groups or marine paint firms.
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of horizontal cooperation agreements under Article 85.3.
Group exemptions. A variation on the exemption procedure is the use of "group" exemptions. In 1965 the Council
granted the Commission the power to exempt certain groups or
types of agreements which the Commission felt fulfilled the
requirements of Article 85.3.43
In 1967, the Commission issued Regulation 67/67, implementing this power of group exemption, in regard to some exclusive dealing agreements. 4 4 These exemptions were based
upon the interpretations of Article 85.1 in cases heard by the
Court of Justice.24 The effect of this regulation was to free the
Commission of the task of individually processing an estimated
thirty thousand agreements granting exclusive supply and purchase rights." The Commission felt that exclusive distribution
agreements met the requirements of Article 85.3 because they
improved distribution and allowed consumers a fair share of
the resulting benefits through better service and lower prices.
Regulation 67/67 exempted those agreements in which a firm
of one Member State bound itself to purchase exclusively from
or sell exclusively to a firm in another Member State. The
group exemption did not apply, however, to the use of
reciprocal exclusive supply agreements, 47 nor to agreements
utilizing national industrial property rights to hinder interstate
trade.' Neither did it allow the partners to block parallel imports by independent distributors."'5
It added these terms because it saw a marked trend toward concentration in this
industry, and because the Japanese member accounted for sixty per cent of Transocean's sales. In addition, there were many changes in membership.
Transocean challenged the Commission's addition of the new terms before the
Court of Justice on the procedural ground that it had not been afforded a sufficient
hearing, and prevailed. Transocean Marine Paint Ass'n v. EEC Comm'n, 11974 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8241 (Ct. J. 1974).
243. Council Regulation 19/65, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2717 (1971).
244. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2727 (1973).
245. Maschinenbau Ulm, supra note 102; Grundig, supra note 12; Government
of Republic of Italy v. EEC Comm'n, [1961-66 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT.
REP.
8048 (Ct. J. 1966).
In the Italian Government case it was charged that the Council had exceeded its
powers in granting the Commission the right to issue group exemptions. The Court of
Justice dismissed the suit.
246. Cawthra, Marketing: Agents, Distributors and Joint Marketing
Arrangements, in CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY, EEC RULES OF COMPETITION,
REPORT OF THE CBI CONFERENCE IN LONDON ON 5 DECEMBER 1972 at 16 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Cawthral.
247. See text accompanying notes 231-32 supra.

248. See text accompanying notes 264-67 infra.
249.

Cawthra, supra note 246, at 16.
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In order to qualify for the group exemption, an agreement
must allow the distributor to fill orders in other territories,
though terms restraining the right to seek these orders actively
do not disqualify it.2 '"
In 1972, pursuant to a new Council authorization to grant
group exemptions,2 ' the Commission issued Regulation
2779/72,252 exempting specialization contracts25 via Article
85.3, where the firms involved accounted for less than ten per
cent or 150 million units of account of the particular market
agreed upon.254
Both Regulation 67/67 and 2779/72 automatically exempt
exclusive supply or purchase terms and specialization agreements fitting within their bounds, without the need for notification to the Commission.2 '
Use of industrialproperty rights to preserve exclusive distribution territories. The use of commercial and industrial
property rights such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights to
block parallel imports and thereby preserve exclusive distribution territories has been the subject of much litigation. The
usual application of Articles 85 and 86256 is complicated by the
overlap of EEC Treaty Articles 30 through 37, which dictate
that the free movement of goods within the EEC is essential
250.

Bransbury, Industrial Property Rights Agreements, in

CONFEDERATION

OF

EEC RULES OF COMPETITION, REPORT OF THE CBI CONFERENCE IN
LONDON ON 5 DECEMBER 1972 at 33 (1973); see BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL S.A., THE EEC
BRITISH INDUSTRY,

ON THE MOVE: ISSUES FOR BUSINESS INAN EXPANDING COMMUNITY 145-46 (Special Report
72-1, 1972).
251. Council Regulation 2821/71, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2729 (1973).
252. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2731 (1973).
253. The Jaz-Peter exemption is an example of such an agreement, discussed in
text accompanying notes 231-32 supra.
254. These agreements are generally presumed by the Commission to be incapable of perceptibly affecting trade within the Community. See the Official Notice on
Contract for Exclusive Representation Concluded with Commercial Agents, Dec. 24,
1962, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2697.
C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 132
255.
(1973)[hereinafter cited as BELLAMY].
256. Article 86 prohibits abuses of dominant position. Treaty of Rome art. 86,
298 U.N.T.S. 48-49 (1958). The text of Article 86 is reproduced in app. B infra.
These abuses include the limitation of production, marketing or technical development to the detriment of consumers, the use of tyihg provisions, and any imposition
of unfair trading conditions. See text accompanying notes 272-95 infra for a more
extended discussion of Article 86. See also Alcoa, supra note 30, at 428, for an American
view that any price set by a monopoly is unreasonable. The Commission may take this
view in the future. See discussion of Commission Decision of December 17, 1975, 2
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9800, note 85, pt. c, supra.
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to the creation of a unitary market.257 It is felt within the Community that there should be neither quotas on imports from
one Member State to another, nor extra "red tape" to hinder
the acquisition of import permits. 5 ' In sum, arbitrary qualitative or quantitative restrictions on imports or exports are not
to be allowed within the Community.
But Article 36 of the EEC Treaty affirms the interest of the
Member States in protecting their commercial and industrial
property. The subjects of patent, trademark, and copyright law
are primarily the domain of EEC States."' That is, the Member States are allowed to grant artificial monopolies to
patentees, copyright holders, and trademark registrants, and
can protect these rights with their laws to encourage inventiveness."" When, however, the application of national law results
in the partitioning of national markets, Community law will
prevail.2 ' The mere fact that an industrial property right is
257. Treaty of Rome arts. 30-37, 298 U.N.T.S. 26-30 (1958).
258. Id.
259. A Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market was signed
on December 15, 1975. [1972-75 Transfer Binder, New Developments] CCH COMM.
MKT. REP. $ 9786 (1975). The nine Member States intend to create a European Patent
Office in Munich, to administer the new Community patent and the European patent
provided for in the Munich Convention on the Grant of European Patents. 2 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. $T 5503-5789 (1974).
The objective of the latest Convention is to replace the patent rules of the Member
States with a unified Community patent law. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9786 (1975).
One result will be that pharmaceuticals will be patentable in Italy in the future.
The national courts of the non-EEC states participating in the 1973 Convention
can revoke European patents only for their own territories. In the Community, however, the revocation process will be handled for all of the Member States, with effect
in all, by a section within the Munich Patent Office, with right of appeal to the Court
of Justice. For European and Community patents, the substantive rules of the 1973
Convention pertaining to grounds for revocation will control. Id.
The Courts of the EEC states will, however, be competent to entertain infringement actions based on Community patents, subject to review by the Court of Justice.
These actions will be brought at the infringer's residence, and can be enforced in all
of the Member States in which infringement has occurred. Id.
As under the former patent laws, Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome, art. 36, 298
U.N.T.S. 29 (1958), will play an important role in voiding attempts to partition national markets via national law. But national courts will remain competent to order
compulsory licensing under their national laws when patent monopolies are exploited
in a manner prejudicial to the public. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9786 (1975). For the
Commission's opinions about the new rules, see Commission Opinion of September 26,
1975, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9777 (1975).
260. See BELLAMY, supra note 255, at 163.
261. Three recent cases considered by the Court of Justice are helpful in understanding the status of patents, trademarks, and copyrights in the Community. In 1974,
the Court issued its decision in Van Zuylen Freres (VZF) v. Hag A.G., [1974 Transfer
Binderl CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8230 (Ct. J. 1974), a suit for trademark infringement.
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used to block parallel imports is not viewed as an anticompetitive practice in the Community. Thus a patent holder may
assign its rights to a subsidiary which is not prohibited from
Hag was the first holder of a patent for decaffeinating coffee. It set up subsidiaries
to register the Hag trademark for this coffee in Belgium and Holland, and in the mid1930's assigned it to Hag/Belgium. Id. at 9115-3. In 1944, Hag/Belgium, seized as
enemy property after the war, and so no longer associated with Hag/A.G., assigned
its trademark for Benelux to VZF, a coffee wholesaler. Id. at 9006. In 1972 Hag A.G.
began selling in Belgium under its German Hag trademark, and VZF sued in a
Belgian Court for trademark infringement. The national appellate court referred the
case to the Court of Justice to determine whether Community or national trademark
law should prevail. Id. The Court denied relief to VZF, holding that Community
law ruled where the application of national law would have the effect of partitioning
national markets. Id. at 9125. The Court concluded that "Article 36 permits derogations from the free movement of goods only to the extent that [they] are justified for
[the purpose of] safeguarding rights that [are] the specific subject matter of
[industrial or commercial] property." Id. at 9124 (emphasis added). The specific
subject matter of a trademark is the exclusive use of the trademark for putting products on the market for the first time, and so identifying the maker of that product. Id.
at 9124-5. In this case, said the Court, the maker was properly identified as Hag A.G.
by its legitimate German trademark. To allow VZF to use its trademark to block Hag's
imports would frustrate a basic aim of the Community-the creation of a unitary
market. Id. There was no fraudulent infringement. Thus no relief was granted, even
though VZF had a legitimate interest in protecting a name which had years of good
will behind it, from a different product which might be mistaken for its own.
Two companion cases following closely on VZF further clarified this area- Centrafarm B.V. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8246, and Centrafarm B.V. v. Winthrop B.V., [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM.
8247 (Ct. J., 1974). Sterling and Winthrop were controlled by a British
MKT. REP.
holding company, and held, respectively, the patents, and the trademark "Negram"
for a chemical used in the preparation of pharmaceuticals. Id. at 9151-46. The patents
and trademarks were registered in Britain, the Netherlands, and elsewhere. Centrafarm purchased the chemical in Britain from a Sterling-Winthrop sales subsidiary, and
then sold it in Holland for twice the price (still underpricing Sterling-Winthrop). Id.
Sterling sued for patent infringement, Winthrop for trademark infringement. The
Court denied relief in both instances. Once again the Court cited Article 36 as its
guiding light, permitting restraints on the free movement of goods within the EEC only
when they are justified for protecting the specific subject matter of the right. See, e.g.,
id. at 9155-56. For a patent, this subject matter is the guarantee to a patentee that he
will be rewarded for his creativity by assigning to him the exclusive right to use the
invention. Id. Thus it would be the legitimate function of a patent to prevent the
importation of identical goods if they were not eligible for a similar patent, and were
produced without the patentee's consent. Id. at 9151-51. This is not the case where the
parallel importer buys from a subsidiary or customer of the patentee. Once the patentee or his distributor puts the product on the market, the property right is said to be
"consumed" or "exhausted," having. served its specific object. Id.
Winthrop sued under Dutch trademark law, wlich permitted relief for unauthorized remarketing of a trademarked product, even when initially purchased from an
authorized distributor. The Court of Justice, applying Community law, held that relief
could be granted only where the parallel importer obtained the trademarked goods
from a country in which the trademark had not been registered. Id. at 9151-66, In the
instant case, said the Court, there was no deception as to the origin of the goods- the
"Negram" trademark had been registered in Britain. Id. at 9151-66, 9151-67.
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blocking the parallel import of goods infringing the patent."
There could be a violation of Article 86, however, where the
patentee assigned the patent to a subsidiary for the purpose of
blocking the parallel import of goods which did not infringe the
patent, so as to protect an exclusive distribution territory.263
The earliest indication of the protection afforded holders
of industrial and commercial property rights by Article 36 was
the Commission's 1962 Notice on Patent Licensing
Agreements.264 In a sort of "group negative clearance," '6' the
Commission said that Articles 85 and 86 did not prohibit the
use of terms:
1. Limiting the right of licensees exclusively to the manufacture or sale of the patented goods, or to one of many
particular exploitations of the patent;""
2. Which dictated production or sale of minimum or
maximum quantities under the license;

3. Which limited the time span of the license to less than
that of the patent itself;
4. Which limited the right of the licensee to grant sublicenses only to those approved by the licensor;
5. Which restricted the use of the patent to a particular
location or factory;
262.
263.

See, e.g., text accompanying note 157 supra.
According to the Court of Justice in Deutsche Grammophon GmbH v.

Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co. KG:

While the difference between the imposed price and the price of the
product imported from another Member State does not necessarily prove
an abuse of dominant position, it can, nevertheless, because of the size
of the difference and the absence of objective justification, constitute a
conclusive indication of such abuse.
[1971-73 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8106, at 7193 (Ct. J. 1971).
But cf. Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda GmbH, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT.
REP. 8101 (Ct. J. 1971). The Court there said that not only must more be shown than
price differential between trademarked and non-trademarked goods for a violation of
Article 86; there must also be a dominant position with respect to these goods in a
"substantial part" of the Community, i.e., the trademark owner must
have the power
to restrain competition in a substantial part of the relevant market within the EEC.
Id. at 7112.
264. Official Notice On Patent Licensing Agreements, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
2698 (1971).
265. OBERDORFER, supra note 11, at 142-43, concludes that this was the effect of
the Official Notice on Patent Licensing Agreements, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1698
(1971).
266. Thus a license might be granted which limited one licensee to manufacture,
another to distribution of the patented goods. See OBERDORFER, supra note 11, at 62.
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6. By which the licensor granted an exclusive license by
not to grant other licenses within a certain terriagreeing
7
26

tory.

The most recent Commission pronouncement on patent
licensing agreements reflects the Court of Justice's view that
Articles 30 through 37, and 85 and 86 prohibit the use of terms
in licensing agreements which cannot be justified on economic
or technical groundsY.5 Examples of terms which are prohibited
include those which (1) require a licensor to grant absolute
territorial protection to a licensee for sales in a given territory;
(2) prohibit a licensee from exporting outside its territory
(though the imposition of a "non-active" sales policy-of not
soliciting orders outside the territory-is still allowed, as in
exclusive distributorship agreements not involving patents);
and (3) prevent a licensee from challenging a patent's valid26
ity. 9
These rules have been drawn from Court of Justice cases
involving industrial property rights, but since there are no per
se wrongs in Community law,2 0 there will be some exceptions.
Additionally, the Court is not bound by the Commission's
opinion, and though it may disagree with these rules, they
271
serve well as general guidelines.
267. The Commission's latest views on patent licensing were purportedly taken
from a confidential Commission report on the subject. EEC Spells Out Views On
Patents and Trademarks, XV BUSINESS EUROPE 52-53 (1975). This report may have
been a forerunner of the Fourth Report on Competition Policy, recently issued by the
Commission, and reported quite briefly in 333 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. EUROMARKET
NEWS, June 3, 1975, at 2-3. The only mention by CCH of patent licensing was that
the Commission may try to handle more such agreements by group exemptions.
The Commission apparently believes that a licensor may restrict a licensee to one
of many possible exploitations of the patent only where the restraint does not appear
to be the result or the means of an agreement to restrict competition between the
licensees. The existence of a restrictive agreement would most likely be presumed
whenever the licensees, though able to exploit all or several technical applications,
were asked to confine themselves to just one such application. XV BUSINESS EUROPE
53 (1975).
268. Id. at 52.
269. Id. These license terms, except one preventing challenges to patent validity,
were approved by the Commission in its decision of June 9, 1972, granting an exemption to Davidson Rubber Co., [1970-72 Transfer Binder, New Developments] CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 1 9512 (1972).
270. Per se wrongs are those which are unlawful no matter how one does them.
Jones, supra note 38, at 22. See note 219 supra for the use of the "Rule of Reason"
and the per se test in American law.
271. The Commission's Official Notices indicate which practices it particularly
dislikes, and thus those which it is most likely to move against. See BELLAMY, supra
note 255, at 18. Neither suits by private parties nor by the Member States are, how-
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PROHIBITS ABUSES OF DOMINANT POSITION

Article 86, unlike Article 85, is applicable to the anticompetitive behavior of one enterprise; it can also be applied to
several enterprises acting in concert, where they collectively
possess a dominant position.272 In its Sugar Cartel decision,273
the Commission said that "[t]his dominating position is a
result of the share of the market held by [it] . . .as well as
the scope which it enjoys for independent action, which allows
it to act without taking much account of . . . its competitors." ' The criteria to be used to determine whether an enterprise in fact occupies such a position are these: (1) the firm's
market share for the relevant products; (2) the size of the enterprise in relation to its competitors; (3) the economic strength
of its customers; (4) the extent to which there exists potential
competition which willbecome actual competition if the enterprise in question overprices its goods, maintains poor product
quality, or imposes odious terms on its customers. 7 5
ever, barred against those who ostensibly fall within the bounds of these notices, for
the Court of Justice may disagree with the Commission on these matters. Id.; Council
Regulation 17, art. 9, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2481 (1971); Treaty of Rome art. 88,
298 U.N.T.S. 49 (1958).
272. See OBERDORFER, supra note 11, at 110; accord, Jones, supra note 38, at 27.
The Court of Justice has not, however, taken this tack in all cases of concerted practices. In neither the Dyestuffs cases, supra note 114, nor in the Quinine Cartel cases,
[1967-70 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8083-8085 (Ct. J. 1970), did the
Court utilize Article 86, despite the fact that price-fixing cartels cannot work to raise
prices unless the cooperating concerns do in fact occupy powerful positions in their
industries. If they do not, and attempt to withhold supplies or raise prices, their
competitors will fill the supply gap and underprice them.
Only in the 1973 European Sugar Industry decision did the Commission find that
Article 86 had been violated by a collective abuse of dominant position. 2 CCH COMM.
MKT. REP. I1 9570 (1973)[hereinafter cited as Sugar Cartel]. And even here, the Commission applied Article 86 to only four of the seventeen firms involved. Of these, two
Dutch firms which cooperated closely in their purchasing, research and development,
advertising, and controlled over eighty-five percent of the Dutch sugar market, were
found to have violated Article 86 by virtue of their cooperation. Id.
The gist of this application of Article 86 is that it will not suffice that many firms
possess a dominant position collectively. The Commission and Court will require something more for a finding of abuse of dominant position-the abuse must be the result
of more than a parallelism of conduct or gentlemen's agreement-there must be a sort
of concern relationship between the firms collectively holding the dominant position.
Otherwise, Article 85 can be applied to their cooperation, or Article 86 to their individual abuses of dominant position.
273. Sugar Cartel, supra note 272.
274. Id. at 9273. The Court of Justice recently decided the Sugar Cartel case. It
substantially reduced the fines assessed by the Commission on the ground that the
Community's regulated sugar market left little room for competition. 363 CCH COMM.
MKT. REP. EUROMARKET NEWS, Dec. 30, 1975, at 2.
275. Continental Can, supra note 85, at 8301.

1976]

EEC ANTITRUST LAW

The first case of a violation of Article 86 was the 1971
Commission decision against GEMA,276 a German firm which
monopolized the administration of copyrights on sound recordings in Germany. Monopolization, which is not a wrong per se
under Community law, was not charged against GEMA.277
Rather, the Commission found that GEMA violated Article 86
by discriminating against non-Germans, who were not allowed
to join the organization and were prevented from obtaining
copyright protection. GEMA also blocked royalty payments to
non-Germans and discouraged parallel imports from outside
Germany of recordings distributed there initially by GEMA
members. 78 No fine was imposed, but GEMA was forced by the
Commission to change its bylaws to conform to Article 86.79
The Commission's second case for violation of Article 86
was its decision against Continental Can Corporation, the
world's largest manufacturer of metal containers.8 0 In 1969,
276. Commission Decision of June 2, 1971, [1970-72 Transfer Binder, New Developmentsl CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9438.
277. Under Community law, there must be an abuse of dominant position. Under
American antitrust law, the mere monopolization is unlawful per se, unless that position is thrust upon it by normal market forces. Thus in Alcoa, supra note 30, Judge
Hand rejected Alcoa's argument that it was a "good" monopolist since its profits had
averaged a modest ten per cent annually:
ITIhe mere fact that a producer, having command of the domestic
market, has not been able to make more than a "fair" profit, is no evidence that a "fair" profit could not have been made at lower prices ...
Congress did not condone "good trusts" and condemn "bad" ones; it
forbad all.
Id. at 427.
In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 345, aff'd,
258 U.S. 451 (1922), a court again declared that a monopolist violates the law even if
it forecloses competition merely by supplying all demand,
United's power does not rest on predatory practices. Probably few monopolies could produce a record so free from any taint of that kind of
wrongdoing . . . United is denied the right to exercise effective control
of the market by business policies that are not the inevitable consequences of its capacities or its natural advantages. That those policies are
not immoral is irrelevant.
Id. at 345.
278. [1970-72 Transfer Binder, New Developments] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9438, at 8951-8 to 8951-12 (EEC Comm'n 1971).
279. Id. at 8951-14 to 8951-16.
280. [1970-72 Transfer Binder, New Developments] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9481 (EEC Comm'n 1971), rev'd, id. 8171 (1973). For a discussion of this case, see
note, Abuse of a Dominant Position by Acquisition in the Common Market; The
Continental Can Cases (Commission and Court of Justice of the European
Communities, 1972 and 1973), 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359 (1973).
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Continental had acquired a controlling interest in the EEC's
leading packaging manufacturer, Schmalbach-Lubeca Werke
A.G. (SLW) of West Germany. SLW had 70 per cent of the
West German market for certain packaging, according to the
Commission. In 1970, Continental had acquired over 90 per
cent of the stock in Benelux's largest metal container manufacturer, Thomassen & Drijver-Verblifa (TDV). Because of their
relationship to Continental, TDV and SLW had primary access
to Continental's technology, patents, and financial backing,
which were unavailable to their competitors. The Commission
found that by its acquisition of TDV, Continental had eliminated its only major potential competition in three EEC markets: meat tins, fish tins, and metal jar caps.2"' Finding an
abuse of dominant position by Continental's acquisition of its
major competitors in the EEC, the Commission ordered divestiture." 2
Continental appealed the decision to the Court of Justice,
which reversed the Commission in 1972.283 The Court agreed
with the Commission that a dominant firm abuses its position
by acquiring its competitors, especially when that expansion
leaves the competitors dependent on the dominant firm for
market leadership, but it was not convinced that Continental
had substantially eliminated its potential competition. As is
the case in American adjudications of mergers and monopolies,
the major issues before the Court of Justice were the delineations of the relevant geographic and product markets.2 4 Merg281. Continental Can, supra note 85, 9481 at 9032. TDV had one-hundred percent of the Benelux Market in meat and fish tins, and fifty percent of the market in
jar caps. Id. at 9026-27.
282. Id. at 9033. See id. at 1 9500.
283. Continental Can, supra note 85, 8171.
284. Id. at 8301-02. In United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 361 U.S.
377 (1956), the Justice Department charged that duPont had monopolized the cellophane market in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). It
had seventy-five percent of this market, but argued that cellophane was part of the
larger flexible wrapping materials market (glassine, wax paper, etc.), and it had just
twenty percent of this larger market. The Court decided that cellophane was a part of
the latter market since the other products were interchangeable with cellophane, at
least functionally. There was, said the Court, a "cross-elasticity of demand" for these
products, meaning that when cellophane's price rose, consumers would substitute
another product for it. Id. at 400. In dissent, Chief Justice Warren argued that cellophane constituted its own submarket since duPont had intentionally kept its price very
high (four to seven times the price of wax paper, glassine, and sulphite paper) and still
enjoyed an explosive growth in sales. Why, asked Warren, would businessmen
purchase a product so expensive if cheap substitutes were available? The answer, he
said, was that the substitutes for cellophane were not equivalent substi-
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ing companies will argue in their defense that the markets they
affect by their mergers are very large, both geographically and
in the types of products which directly compete with theirs.2
Therefore, merging companies argue that as they compete with
firms over a wide geographic area and with a diverse range of
products, their market power will diminish.
In the instant case Continental argued that meat and fish
tins and metal jar caps were part of a larger container market,
including those for fruits, vegetables, milk, oil, juices, and industrial products. As a result, its market share was much
smaller than that portrayed by the Commission. In addition,
Continental asserted that the relevant market was the whole
of the EEC rather than just Benelux and northern Germany,
since there were competitors in other parts of the Community.
The Court of Justice accepted both of these arguments and
8 6 It was not satisfied that the
allowed the mergers to stand."
relevant markets were correctly defined by the Commission.
The Court was not convinced that glass containers did not
compete with Continental's metal products. Nor did it agree
with the Commission that there were separate submarkets of
fish and meat tins and jar caps. Finally, it was skeptical of the
Commission's argument that there was no competition from
28 7
other areas of the EEC.

tutes-cellophane combined the virtues of aluminum foil, philofilm, glassine, wax
paper, etc.-i.e., it was much more versatile than the competing products. Id. at 41617.
Much the same problem was considered by the Court in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 274 (1964). The Justice Department charged that Alcoa,
by its acquisition of Rome Cable Corp., violated section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 18, in that it might substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
(section 7 is directed against monopolies in their incipiency). Id. at 272-73. Alcoa
argued that aluminum cable, of which it was the leading producer, with about thirty
percent of that market (Rome was the eighth-largest producer with about five percent), was part of the larger metal conductor market containing copper cable. Id. at
273-74. Copper cable, however, was priced much higher than aluminum, and the
Court decided that copper and aluminum conductors constituted separate submarkets. Id. at 276-77. Thus the merger was disapproved on the ground that it might lead
to a monopoly in the aluminum conductor submarket. Id. at 280-81.
Cf. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1964); Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 295 (1962). For a case analyzing relevant geographic
markets, see Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
285. See, e.g., Continental Can, supra note 85, 8171, at 8292.
286. Id. at 8301-03.
287. Id. at 8302.
The business community can draw comfort from this severity [of the
Court] because it diminishes the likelihood of successful prosecutions
under Article 86. Given the fact that the Commission is generally ill-
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Later in 1972 the Commission charged a violation of Article 86 by Commercial Solvents Corporation (U.S.) and its
Italian subsidiary, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano (ICI).*25
The charge was based on ICI's refusal to sell to Zoja, its main
Italian competitor, a chemical in which ICI had a nearmonopoly." ' ICI argued that it did not hold a dominant position in relation to the chemical since there were substitutes,
and the relevant market was the larger one for the derivative
drug, not that for the base chemical alone.
The Commission rejected these arguments. 9 Substitutes
were still experimental, and most manufacturers of the drug
used only ICI's chemical. In this situation, said the Commission, it would be absurd to pretend that ICI did not hold a
commanding position in the derivative market, since it controlled the base-chemical submarket. The Court was not as
assertive as the Commission, but admitted that "[an] abuse
of a dominant position on the market for raw materials may
. . . have [anticompetitive effects] in the market on which
derivatives of the raw material are sold . . . even if the market
equipped to undertake thorough and large-scale probes into a given
market, it will probably be hard put in many future cases to supply
the necessary amount of evidence of market dominance to satisfy the
European Court.
Ramifications of the European Courts Decision In The EEC - Continental Can Case,
XIII Bus. EUROPE 66 (1973).
Indeed, there have been no anti-merger cases argued by the Commission since the
('ontinental Can case in 1973; see also the Commission's approval of the Chevron-SHV
joint venture, supra note 50. Another gauge of the Community's lack of concern with
concentrations is the Council's failure to institute a system whereby the Commission
would he able to require prior notification of any mergers which involve firms with sales
of more than one-billion dollars annually. The Treaty Establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community § 66, April 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 142, has such a requirement,
so as to allow the Commission to consider the effects of such mergers before they
become faits accomplis and thus more difficult to undo.
In a release on industrial concentration and a 1973 draft of the merger control
regulation for the Council's consideration, CCH reported that mergers and acquisitions
are steadily increasing: acquisitions of more than fifty percent of a company's stock or
capital were 173 in 1962, and 612 in 1970; the rate doubled in the period from 1966 to
1970, as compared with that from 1962 to 1966. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9586 (1973).
One must, however, always keep in mind that Europe's industries are not developed,
in many cases, to the same extent as those in the United States: "The structure of
European industry is characterized by an overwhelming majority of inefficiently small
plants." Marchini-Camia, supra note 43, at 10.
288. 11972-75 Transfer Binder, New Developments] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9543 (EEC Comm'n 1972).
289. Id. at 9215-2. The refusal to sell came about subsequent to the breakdown
of merger talks between the two firms. Id. at 9215-3 to 9215-4.
290. Commercial Solvents, supra note 26, at 8818-19.
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for the derivative does not constitute a self-contained market.'

29

ICI further argued that since Zoja sold 90 per cent of its
products outside the EEC, there was no significant effect on
trade within. The Commission rejected this argument, holding
that ICI's refusal to sell demonstrated an intent to force a
competitor out of business. In addition, the Court held that the
elimination of even potential competition is bound to have
adverse effects on trade within the Community." 2 The Court
upheld the Commission and assessed a fine of 200,000 units of
account against CSC and ICI.293
In 1975 the Commission charged General Motors
Continental, S.A. (GMC), with a violation of Article 86, which
' GMC handled
resulted in a fine of 100,000 units of account. 94
all legal requirements for sales of General Motors products in
Belgium. It alone was able, by virtue of a Belgian statute, to
obtain certificates of conformity for each car which was imported, and certificates of approval by the Belgian government
as to each model. Until 1972, GMC performed these services at
no charge for parallel importers of GM products. Then, in 1972.,
it began charging for the service, and in 1973 the fees were
raised substantially, though the cost to GMC was minimal. 9 '
The Commission found that GMC's Belgian dealers had a sub291. Id.Several American cases have involved extended analyses of geographic
and product submarkets. The delineation of geographic submarkets was a central issue
in Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). Product submarkets
were at issue in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964); Brown
Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 295 (1962); United States v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Alcoa, supra note 30. See generally, note 284
supra.
292. Commercial Solvents, supra note 26, at 8821. Cf. United States v. PennOlin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 173-74 (1964).
293. Commercial Solvents, supra note 26, at 8823. The unit of account was at
that time roughly equivalent to one U.S. dollar. Cf. note 209 supra.
294. GMC, supra note 85.
295. Id. The Court of Justice recently overturned the Commission's decision in
this case on the ground that GMC did not abuse its dominant position. General Motors
Continental S.A. v. EEC Comm'n, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8230 (Ct. J. 1975). The
Court held that there had been an insufficient showing that GMC had charged so
excessively as to discourage parallel imports:
The Court did not rule out entirely the possibility that the dominant
position had been abused. But it found in favor of GMC because the
company had promptly reduced the fees charged for imported cars to a
"real cost" level and refunded the excess prior to the Commission's investigation.
Id. at 7735.
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stantial competitive advantage over the parallel importers,
since the approval charges for the former were approximately
$3 per car. It ruled that GMC abused its legislatively conferred
dominant position by fees so disproportionate to its costs that
it in effect partitioned the Belgian market, making the acquisition of GM products outside Belgium more difficult.
CONCLUSION

The highlight of EEC competition law is its flexibility to
permit practices which would ordinarily be considered destructive of normal market conditions. Article 85.3 of the Treaty of
Rome is a clear illustration of this feature; it permits practices
such as joint marketing and exclusive supply or purchasing
agreements which limit competitive opportunities, but improve production and distribution, and lower prices. Normally,
exemptions under Article 85.3 are granted individually, but the
Commission has in some cases resorted to group exemptions for
categories of agreements.
The Commission has in fact made great use of administrative procedures such as exemptions and negative clearances,
rather than relying on judicial actions to carry out its policies.
Practices most strictly discouraged under Community
competition law are not, oddly enough, those which involve
horizontal cooperation. Rather, those practices which erect
national trade barriers to create exclusive sales or distribution
territories are most heartily disapproved, since the Community
is premised on the assumption that the larger international
market created by the EEC will allow for the most rational use
and dispersion of resources and goods, unchecked by artificial
barriers such as tariffs. Exclusive sales territories would serve
merely to replace old artificial barriers with new ones, whereas
cooperation can in many instances allow firms to use their
resources more intensively. The creation of the common market also serves to promote close relations between the Member
States.
To further its policy of encouraging efficient use of resources, monopolies are not outlawed in the EEC as in the
United States. The reason is that monopolies are potentially
able to take advantage of economies of scale and can thus do
business most efficiently. Only when they abuse their "dominant position" do monopolies violate Article 86, and the fact
that this abuse has been found in so few cases indicates an
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encouragement of monopolistic growth by the Court of Justice.
Only where predatory practices are used do the provisions of
Article 86 have any effect, in practice.
The goal of a unitary market blankets nearly every phase
of Common Market antitrust law. Cross-boundary mergers and
cooperation which might otherwise be viewed unfavorably are
approved because they promote market integration and efficiency. Market domination is also excused, since in most cases
the EEC views this, too, as an acceptable means of achieving
market integration.
The purpose of these goals is to benefit consumers; however, the means used by EEC authorities to promote these
benefits differ from those used by American authorities, and
perhaps necessarily so. The EEC's situation differs substantially from that of the United States because the EEC is composed of sovereign nations whose independence must be cautiously respected.
Remedies for the abuses of free-market capitalism began
in the United States with the Sherman Act in 1890. The EEC's
development of antitrust remedies did not begin until 1957. As
a result, antitrust law in the EEC has not fully developed a
body of precedent similar to that which has evolved through 85
years of litigation in the United States.
The underlying purposes and philosophy of the EEC differ
from those expressed in American antitrust law. The EEC is
primarily an economic organization, and its purpose for the
most part is economic progress. Indeed, the early articles of the
Rome Treaty underscore the fact that one purpose of the Community is to raise the standard of living for the peoples
within. 96
The United States, on the other hand, is primarily a political entity with one national government and history, concerned
not just with economic progress, but with order and the preser296. See, e.g., Treaty of Rome art. 85.3, 298 U.N.T.S. 48 (1958), which conditions
exemptions partially on benefit to consumers. Cf. id., Preamble, 298 U.N.T.S. 14. One
of the primary political aims of the Community-to promote closer ties between the
Member States (id., art. 2, 298 U.N.T.S. 15)-has perhaps been underemphasized.
The reason for this is the seeming absence of this element in Community antitrust
policy. There has been some success in creating Community law to govern uniformly,
e.g., through the Patent Convention discussed in note 259 supra. But the customs
union concept-the means to achieving closer relations by dissolving national trade
barriers-has remained the Community's most important aspect. Cf. CCH COMM.
MKT. REP. 11162.03 (1973).
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vation of political and civil liberties. The thrust of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts is that of economic pluralism, counterbalancing economic interests in order to preserve political as well as
economic freedom." 7 In choosing between the virtues of bigness
on the one hand, and of independence and competition on the
other, the framers of these statutes clearly chose the latter.
They believed that larger operations with their economies of
scale would prevail over competitors and become complacent.
Uniform thinking would then replace innovative thinking,
which can exist only in a competitive environment. The authors of American antitrust law placed their faith in competition alone.
In time, the EEC may come around to this view. But for
the near future, the EEC will have to develop more certain
rules and the machinery to enforce them. The experience in
recent years with the abuses of international cartels and giant,
multi-national corporations may encourage the Member States
to strengthen Community antitrust safeguards, enabling each
to reach beyond its own borders in order to control abuses
originating outside the EEC.
Americans should not be too critical of the apparent weakness of Community antitrust law. While American law has in
some instances allowed the growth of great concentrations of
economic power, it has frustrated genuine competition in many
cases.

298

297. Compare the Community's use of Treaty Article 85.3 to allow any type of
restrictive agreement so long as its economic advantages are seen to outweigh its
anticompetitive effects, with its analogue, the American "Rule of Reason," which is
not applied to those practices considered per se unreasonable restraints of trade. See
note 219 supra. And note that the American counterbalancing inherent in its antitrust
law requires government manipulation to maintain a balance of interests sufficient to
preserve these freedoms.
298. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d
Cir. 1945), wherein Judge Hand emphasized that
Congress did not condone "good trusts" and condemn "bad" ones; it
forbad all. Moreover, in so doing it was not necessarily [motivated] by
economic motives alone. It is possible, because of its indirect social or
moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for
his success on his own skill and character, to one in which the great mass
of those engaged must accept the direction of a few.
The effects of this philosophy have been severely criticized as ignoring economic
realities. Witness the Supreme Court's disapproval of a merger in United States v.
Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270 (1966), which involved two grocery chains with combined
sales of 7.5 percent of the Los Angeles retail food market, making them the secondlargest chain in the area. Id. at 272. The Court held that the increasing power of chains
in the area, combined with the disappearance of single store firms due to acquisitions
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As Justice Brandeis said, the essence of every agreement
is to restrain trade."' 9 Whether these restraints merely harm
competitors or indeed destroy competition is a question upon
which reasonable men can differ. However, the EEC rules of
competition are not necessarily "worse" for their weaknesses in
relation to American law. The provisions for reporting agreements to the Commission may, in fact, strengthen EEC rules.
The framers of the EEC rules suited them to the organization
and circumstances from whence they issued, and only time will
tell which set of rules will eventually be recognized as the more
successful in furthering its goals.
Michael B. Blume

and mergers, made the merger a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §
18 (1970), by lessening competition. 384 U.S. at 274-79. Justice Stewart dissented,
objecting that the Court had misused section 7 by protecting obsolescent competitors,
when the statute's aim was instead to protect competition. Competition was not lessened by the mere numerical decrease of stores, he stressed, since each did not necessarily compete effectively. Id. at 286-304.
299. See note 219 supra for the text of this statement.
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Appendix A
TREATY OF ROME ANTITRUST PROVISIONS*

ARTICLE 85**

1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with
the common market: all agreements between undertakings,
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction,
or distortion of competition within the common market and in
particular, those which
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or
any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at
a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to
this Article shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between
undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations
of undertakings;
- any concerted practice or category of concerted
practices, which contributes to improving the production
or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of
the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment
of these objectives;
* Treaty Establishing The European Economic Community, Rome, March 25,
1957, 298 UNTS 47.
** Official English text, January 1, 1973, published in CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
2005 ff.
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(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of
the products in question.
Appendix B
ARTICLE

86*

Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant
position within the common market or in a substantial part of
it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market
in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such
abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets of technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at
a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.

* Official English text, January 1, 1973, published in CCH

REP.

2101.

